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A Theory of Human Motivation
A. H. Maslow (1943)
Classics in the History of Psychology
An internet resource developed by
Christopher D. Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario
ISSN 1492-3713
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A Theory of Human Motivation
A. H. Maslow (1943)
Originally Published in Psychological Review, 50, 370-396.
Posted August 2000
[p. 370] I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous paper (13) various propositions were presented which would have to be included
in any theory of human motivation that could lay claim to being definitive. These conclusions
may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. The integrated wholeness of the organism must be one of the foundation stones
of motivation theory.
2. The hunger drive (or any other physiological drive) was rejected as a centering
point or model for a definitive theory of motivation. Any drive that is somatically
based and localizable was shown to be atypical rather than typical in human
motivation.
3. Such a theory should stress and center itself upon ultimate or basic goals rather
than partial or superficial ones, upon ends rather than means to these ends. Such a
stress would imply a more central place for unconscious than for conscious
motivations.
4. There are usually available various cultural paths to the same goal. Therefore
conscious, specific, local-cultural desires are not as fundamental in motivation
theory as the more basic, unconscious goals.
5. Any motivated behavior, either preparatory or consummatory, must be
understood to be a channel through which many basic needs may be
simultaneously expressed or satisfied. Typically an act has more than one
motivation.
6. Practically all organismic states are to be understood as motivated and as
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motivating.
7. Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say,
the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more
pre-potent need. Man is a perpetually wanting animal. Also no need or drive can be
treated as if it were isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction of other drives.
8. Lists of drives will get us nowhere for various theoretical and practical reasons.
Furthermore any classification of motivations [p. 371] must deal with the problem of
levels of specificity or generalization the motives to be classified.
9. Classifications of motivations must be based upon goals rather than upon
instigating drives or motivated behavior.
10. Motivation theory should be human-centered rather than animal-centered.
11. The situation or the field in which the organism reacts must be taken into
account but the field alone can rarely serve as an exclusive explanation for
behavior. Furthermore the field itself must be interpreted in terms of the organism.
Field theory cannot be a substitute for motivation theory.
12. Not only the integration of the organism must be taken into account, but also the
possibility of isolated, specific, partial or segmental reactions. It has since become
necessary to add to these another affirmation.
13. Motivation theory is not synonymous with behavior theory. The motivations are
only one class of determinants of behavior. While behavior is almost always
motivated, it is also almost always biologically, culturally and situationally
determined as well.
The present paper is an attempt to formulate a positive theory of motivation which will satisfy
these theoretical demands and at the same time conform to the known facts, clinical and
observational as well as experimental. It derives most directly, however, from clinical
experience. This theory is, I think, in the functionalist tradition of James and Dewey, and is
fused with the holism of Wertheimer (19), Goldstein (6), and Gestalt Psychology, and with the
dynamicism of Freud (4) and Adler (1). This fusion or synthesis may arbitrarily be called a
'general-dynamic' theory.
It is far easier to perceive and to criticize the aspects in motivation theory than to remedy them.
Mostly this is because of the very serious lack of sound data in this area. I conceive this lack of
sound facts to be due primarily to the absence of a valid theory of motivation. The present
theory then must be considered to be a suggested program or framework for future research
and must stand or fall, not so much on facts available or evidence presented, as upon
researches to be done, researches suggested perhaps, by the questions raised in this paper.[p.
372]
II. THE BASIC NEEDS
The 'physiological' needs. -- The needs that are usually taken as the starting point for
motivation theory are the so-called physiological drives. Two recent lines of research make it
necessary to revise our customary notions about these needs, first, the development of the
concept of homeostasis, and second, the finding that appetites (preferential choices among
foods) are a fairly efficient indication of actual needs or lacks in the body.
Homeostasis refers to the body's automatic efforts to maintain a constant, normal state of the
blood stream. Cannon (2) has described this process for (1) the water content of the blood, (2)
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salt content, (3) sugar content, (4) protein content, (5) fat content, (6) calcium content, (7)
oxygen content, (8) constant hydrogen-ion level (acid-base balance) and (9) constant
temperature of the blood. Obviously this list can be extended to include other minerals, the
hormones, vitamins, etc.
Young in a recent article (21) has summarized the work on appetite in its relation to body
needs. If the body lacks some chemical, the individual will tend to develop a specific appetite or
partial hunger for that food element.
Thus it seems impossible as well as useless to make any list of fundamental physiological
needs for they can come to almost any number one might wish, depending on the degree of
specificity of description. We can not identify all physiological needs as homeostatic. That
sexual desire, sleepiness, sheer activity and maternal behavior in animals, are homeostatic,
has not yet been demonstrated. Furthermore, this list would not include the various sensory
pleasures (tastes, smells, tickling, stroking) which are probably physiological and which may
become the goals of motivated behavior.
In a previous paper (13) it has been pointed out that these physiological drives or needs are to
be considered unusual rather than typical because they are isolable, and because they are
localizable somatically. That is to say, they are relatively independent of each other, of other
motivations [p. 373] and of the organism as a whole, and secondly, in many cases, it is possible
to demonstrate a localized, underlying somatic base for the drive. This is true less generally
than has been thought (exceptions are fatigue, sleepiness, maternal responses) but it is still
true in the classic instances of hunger, sex, and thirst.
It should be pointed out again that any of the physiological needs and the consummatory
behavior involved with them serve as channels for all sorts of other needs as well. That is to
say, the person who thinks he is hungry may actually be seeking more for comfort, or
dependence, than for vitamins or proteins. Conversely, it is possible to satisfy the hunger need
in part by other activities such as drinking water or smoking cigarettes. In other words, relatively
isolable as these physiological needs are, they are not completely so.
Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most pre-potent of all needs. What this means
specifically is, that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it
is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others.
A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food
more strongly than for anything else.
If all the needs are unsatisfied, and the organism is then dominated by the physiological needs,
all other needs may become simply non-existent or be pushed into the background. It is then
fair to characterize the whole organism by saying simply that it is hungry, for consciousness is
almost completely preempted by hunger. All capacities are put into the service of hunger-
satisfaction, and the organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one
purpose of satisfying hunger. The receptors and effectors, the intelligence, memory, habits, all
may now be defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools. Capacities that are not useful for this
purpose lie dormant, or are pushed into the background. The urge to write poetry, the desire to
acquire an automobile, the interest in American history, the desire for a new pair of shoes are,
in the extreme case, forgotten or become of sec-[p.374]ondary importance. For the man who is
extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist but food. He dreams food, he
remembers food, he thinks about food, he emotes only about food, he perceives only food and
he wants only food. The more subtle determinants that ordinarily fuse with the physiological
drives in organizing even feeding, drinking or sexual behavior, may now be so completely
overwhelmed as to allow us to speak at this time (but only at this time) of pure hunger drive and
behavior, with the one unqualified aim of relief.
Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain need is
that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically and extremely
hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is plenty of food. He
tends to think that, if only he is guaranteed food for the rest of his life, he will be perfectly happy
and will never want anything more. Life itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything
else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy,
may all be waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach. Such
a man may fairly be said to live by bread alone.
It cannot possibly be denied that such things are true but their generality can be denied.
Emergency conditions are, almost by definition, rare in the normally functioning peaceful
society. That this truism can be forgotten is due mainly to two reasons. First, rats have few
motivations other than physiological ones, and since so much of the research upon motivation
has been made with these animals, it is easy to carry the rat-picture over to the human being.
Secondly, it is too often not realized that culture itself is an adaptive tool, one of whose main
functions is to make the physiological emergencies come less and less often. In most of the
known societies, chronic extreme hunger of the emergency type is rare, rather than common. In
any case, this is still true in the United States. The average American citizen is experiencing
appetite rather than hunger when he says "I am [p. 375] hungry." He is apt to experience sheer
life-and-death hunger only by accident and then only a few times through his entire life.
Obviously a good way to obscure the 'higher' motivations, and to get a lopsided view of human
capacities and human nature, is to make the organism extremely and chronically hungry or
thirsty. Anyone who attempts to make an emergency picture into a typical one, and who will
measure all of man's goals and desires by his behavior during extreme physiological
deprivation is certainly being blind to many things. It is quite true that man lives by bread alone
-- when there is no bread. But what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of bread and
when his belly is chronically filled?
At once other (and 'higher') needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers,
dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still 'higher')
needs emerge and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are
organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency.
One main implication of this phrasing is that gratification becomes as important a concept as
deprivation in motivation theory, for it releases the organism from the domination of a relatively
more physiological need, permitting thereby the emergence of other more social goals. The
physiological needs, along with their partial goals, when chronically gratified cease to exist as
active determinants or organizers of behavior. They now exist only in a potential fashion in the
sense that they may emerge again to dominate the organism if they are thwarted. But a want
that is satisfied is no longer a want. The organism is dominated and its behavior organized only
by unsatisfied needs. If hunger is satisfied, it becomes unimportant in the current dynamics of
the individual.
This statement is somewhat qualified by a hypothesis to be discussed more fully later, namely
that it is precisely those individuals in whom a certain need has always been satisfied who are
best equipped to tolerate deprivation of that need in the future, and that furthermore, those who
have been de-[p. 376]prived in the past will react differently to current satisfactions than the one
who has never been deprived.
The safety needs. -- If the physiological needs are relatively well gratified, there then emerges a
new set of needs, which we may categorize roughly as the safety needs. All that has been said
of the physiological needs is equally true, although in lesser degree, of these desires. The
organism may equally well be wholly dominated by them. They may serve as the almost
exclusive organizers of behavior, recruiting all the capacities of the organism in their service,
and we may then fairly describe the whole organism as a safety-seeking mechanism. Again we
may say of the receptors, the effectors, of the intellect and the other capacities that they are
primarily safety-seeking tools. Again, as in the hungry man, we find that the dominating goal is
a strong determinant not only of his current world-outlook and philosophy but also of his
philosophy of the future. Practically everything looks less important than safety, (even
sometimes the physiological needs which being satisfied, are now underestimated). A man, in
this state, if it is extreme enough and chronic enough, may be characterized as living almost for
safety alone.
Although in this paper we are interested primarily in the needs of the adult, we can approach an
understanding of his safety needs perhaps more efficiently by observation of infants and
children, in whom these needs are much more simple and obvious. One reason for the clearer
appearance of the threat or danger reaction in infants, is that they do not inhibit this reaction at
all, whereas adults in our society have been taught to inhibit it at all costs. Thus even when
adults do feel their safety to be threatened we may not be able to see this on the surface.
Infants will react in a total fashion and as if they were endangered, if they are disturbed or
dropped suddenly, startled by loud noises, flashing light, or other unusual sensory stimulation,
by rough handling, by general loss of support in the mother's arms, or by inadequate support.
[1][p. 377]
In infants we can also see a much more direct reaction to bodily illnesses of various kinds.
Sometimes these illnesses seem to be immediately and per se threatening and seem to make
the child feel unsafe. For instance, vomiting, colic or other sharp pains seem to make the child
look at the whole world in a different way. At such a moment of pain, it may be postulated that,
for the child, the appearance of the whole world suddenly changes from sunniness to darkness,
so to speak, and becomes a place in which anything at all might happen, in which previously
stable things have suddenly become unstable. Thus a child who because of some bad food is
taken ill may, for a day or two, develop fear, nightmares, and a need for protection and
reassurance never seen in him before his illness.
Another indication of the child's need for safety is his preference for some kind of undisrupted
routine or rhythm. He seems to want a predictable, orderly world. For instance, injustice,
unfairness, or inconsistency in the parents seems to make a child feel anxious and unsafe. This
attitude may be not so much because of the injustice per se or any particular pains involved,
but rather because this treatment threatens to make the world look unreliable, or unsafe, or
unpredictable. Young children seem to thrive better under a system which has at least a
skeletal outline of rigidity, In which there is a schedule of a kind, some sort of routine,
something that can be counted upon, not only for the present but also far into the future.
Perhaps one could express this more accurately by saying that the child needs an organized
world rather than an unorganized or unstructured one.
The central role of the parents and the normal family setup are indisputable. Quarreling,
physical assault, separation, divorce or death within the family may be particularly terrifying.
Also parental outbursts of rage or threats of punishment directed to the child, calling him
names, speaking to him harshly, shaking him, handling him roughly, or actual [p. 378] physical
punishment sometimes elicit such total panic and terror in the child that we must assume more
is involved than the physical pain alone. While it is true that in some children this terror may
represent also a fear of loss of parental love, it can also occur in completely rejected children,
who seem to cling to the hating parents more for sheer safety and protection than because of
hope of love.
Confronting the average child with new, unfamiliar, strange, unmanageable stimuli or situations
will too frequently elicit the danger or terror reaction, as for example, getting lost or even being
separated from the parents for a short time, being confronted with new faces, new situations or
new tasks, the sight of strange, unfamiliar or uncontrollable objects, illness or death.
Particularly at such times, the child's frantic clinging to his parents is eloquent testimony to their
role as protectors (quite apart from their roles as food-givers and love-givers).
From these and similar observations, we may generalize and say that the average child in our
society generally prefers a safe, orderly, predictable, organized world, which he can count, on,
and in which unexpected, unmanageable or other dangerous things do not happen, and in
which, in any case, he has all-powerful parents who protect and shield him from harm.
That these reactions may so easily be observed in children is in a way a proof of the fact that
children in our society, feel too unsafe (or, in a word, are badly brought up). Children who are
reared in an unthreatening, loving family do not ordinarily react as we have described above
(17). In such children the danger reactions are apt to come mostly to objects or situations that
adults too would consider dangerous.[2]
The healthy, normal, fortunate adult in our culture is largely satisfied in his safety needs. The
peaceful, smoothly [p. 379] running, 'good' society ordinarily makes its members feel safe
enough from wild animals, extremes of temperature, criminals, assault and murder, tyranny,
etc. Therefore, in a very real sense, he no longer has any safety needs as active motivators.
Just as a sated man no longer feels hungry, a safe man no longer feels endangered. If we wish
to see these needs directly and clearly we must turn to neurotic or near-neurotic individuals,
and to the economic and social underdogs. In between these extremes, we can perceive the
expressions of safety needs only in such phenomena as, for instance, the common preference
for a job with tenure and protection, the desire for a savings account, and for insurance of
various kinds (medical, dental, unemployment, disability, old age).
Other broader aspects of the attempt to seek safety and stability in the world are seen in the
very common preference for familiar rather than unfamiliar things, or for the known rather than
the unknown. The tendency to have some religion or world-philosophy that organizes the
universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in
part motivated by safety-seeking. Here too we may list science and philosophy in general as
partially motivated by the safety needs (we shall see later that there are also other motivations
to scientific, philosophical or religious endeavor).
Otherwise the need for safety is seen as an active and dominant mobilizer of the organism's
resources only in emergencies, e. g., war, disease, natural catastrophes, crime waves, societal
disorganization, neurosis, brain injury, chronically bad situation.
Some neurotic adults in our society are, in many ways, like the unsafe child in their desire for
safety, although in the former it takes on a somewhat special appearance. Their reaction is
often to unknown, psychological dangers in a world that is perceived to be hostile,
overwhelming and threatening. Such a person behaves as if a great catastrophe were almost
always impending, i.e., he is usually responding as if to an emergency. His safety needs often
find specific [p. 380] expression in a search for a protector, or a stronger person on whom he
may depend, or perhaps, a Fuehrer.
The neurotic individual may be described in a slightly different way with some usefulness as a
grown-up person who retains his childish attitudes toward the world. That is to say, a neurotic
adult may be said to behave 'as if' he were actually afraid of a spanking, or of his mother's
disapproval, or of being abandoned by his parents, or having his food taken away from him. It is
as if his childish attitudes of fear and threat reaction to a dangerous world had gone
underground, and untouched by the growing up and learning processes, were now ready to be
called out by any stimulus that would make a child feel endangered and threatened.[3]
The neurosis in which the search for safety takes its dearest form is in the compulsive-
obsessive neurosis. Compulsive-obsessives try frantically to order and stabilize the world so
that no unmanageable, unexpected or unfamiliar dangers will ever appear (14); They hedge
themselves about with all sorts of ceremonials, rules and formulas so that every possible
contingency may be provided for and so that no new contingencies may appear. They are
much like the brain injured cases, described by Goldstein (6), who manage to maintain their
equilibrium by avoiding everything unfamiliar and strange and by ordering their restricted world
in such a neat, disciplined, orderly fashion that everything in the world can be counted upon.
They try to arrange the world so that anything unexpected (dangers) cannot possibly occur. If,
through no fault of their own, something unexpected does occur, they go into a panic reaction
as if this unexpected occurrence constituted a grave danger. What we can see only as a none-
too-strong preference in the healthy person, e. g., preference for the familiar, becomes a life-
and-death. necessity in abnormal cases.
The love needs. -- If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified, then
there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs, and the whole cycle [p. 381]
already described will repeat itself with this new center. Now the person will feel keenly, as
never before, the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children. He will hunger for
affectionate relations with people in general, namely, for a place in his group, and he will strive
with great intensity to achieve this goal. He will want to attain such a place more than anything
else in the world and may even forget that once, when he was hungry, he sneered at love.
In our society the thwarting of these needs is the most commonly found core in cases of
maladjustment and more severe psychopathology. Love and affection, as well as their possible
expression in sexuality, are generally looked upon with ambivalence and are customarily
hedged about with many restrictions and inhibitions. Practically all theorists of psychopathology
have stressed thwarting of the love needs as basic in the picture of maladjustment. Many
clinical studies have therefore been made of this need and we know more about it perhaps than
any of the other needs except the physiological ones (14).
One thing that must be stressed at this point is that love is not synonymous with sex. Sex may
be studied as a purely physiological need. Ordinarily sexual behavior is multi-determined, that
is to say, determined not only by sexual but also by other needs, chief among which are the
love and affection needs. Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the love needs involve both
giving and receiving love.[4]
The esteem needs. -- All people in our society (with a few pathological exceptions) have a need
or desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or
self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. By firmly based self-esteem, we mean that which is
soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others. These needs may be
classified into two subsidiary sets. These are, first, the desire for strength, for achievement, for
adequacy, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom.[5]
Secondly, we have what [p. 382] we may call the desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as
respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation.[6]
These needs have been relatively stressed by Alfred Adler and his followers, and have been
relatively neglected by Freud and the psychoanalysts. More and more today however there is
appearing widespread appreciation of their central importance.
Satisfaction of the self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength,
capability and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world. But thwarting of these
needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness and of helplessness. These feelings in turn
give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends. An
appreciation of the necessity of basic self-confidence and an understanding of how helpless
people are without it, can be easily gained from a study of severe traumatic neurosis (8).[7]
The need for self-actualization. -- Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not
always) expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual
is doing what he is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must
write, if he is to be ultimately happy. What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call
self-actualization.
This term, first coined by Kurt Goldstein, is being used in this paper in a much more specific
and limited fashion. It refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to
become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to
become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.[p.
383]
The specific form that these needs will take will of course vary greatly from person to person. In
one individual it may take the form of the desire to be an ideal mother, in another it may be
expressed athletically, and in still another it may be expressed in painting pictures or in
inventions. It is not necessarily a creative urge although in people who have any capacities for
creation it will take this form.
The clear emergence of these needs rests upon prior satisfaction of the physiological, safety,
love and esteem needs. We shall call people who are satisfied in these needs, basically
satisfied people, and it is from these that we may expect the fullest (and healthiest)
creativeness.[8] Since, in our society, basically satisfied people are the exception, we do not
know much about self-actualization, either experimentally or clinically. It remains a challenging
problem for research.
The preconditions for the basic need satisfactions. -- There are certain conditions which are
immediate prerequisites for the basic need satisfactions. Danger to these is reacted to almost
as if it were a direct danger to the basic needs themselves. Such conditions as freedom to
speak, freedom to do what one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to
express one's self, freedom to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend one's
self, justice, fairness, honesty, orderliness in the group are examples of such preconditions for
basic need satisfactions. Thwarting in these freedoms will be reacted to with a threat or
emergency response. These conditions are not ends in themselves but they are almost so
since they are so closely related to the basic needs, which are apparently the only ends in
themselves. These conditions are defended because without them the basic satisfactions are
quite impossible, or at least, very severely endangered.[p. 384]
If we remember that the cognitive capacities (perceptual, intellectual, learning) are a set of
adjustive tools, which have, among other functions, that of satisfaction of our basic needs, then
it is clear that any danger to them, any deprivation or blocking of their free use, must also be
indirectly threatening to the basic needs themselves. Such a statement is a partial solution of
the general problems of curiosity, the search for knowledge, truth and wisdom, and the ever-
persistent urge to solve the cosmic mysteries.
We must therefore introduce another hypothesis and speak of degrees of closeness to the
basic needs, for we have already pointed out that any conscious desires (partial goals) are
more or less important as they are more or less close to the basic needs. The same statement
may be made for various behavior acts. An act is psychologically important if it contributes
directly to satisfaction of basic needs. The less directly it so contributes, or the weaker this
contribution is, the less important this act must be conceived to be from the point of view of
dynamic psychology. A similar statement may be made for the various defense or coping
mechanisms. Some are very directly related to the protection or attainment of the basic needs,
others are only weakly and distantly related. Indeed if we wished, we could speak of more basic
and less basic defense mechanisms, and then affirm that danger to the more basic defenses is
more threatening than danger to less basic defenses (always remembering that this is so only
because of their relationship to the basic needs).
The desires to know and to understand. -- So far, we have mentioned the cognitive needs only
in passing. Acquiring knowledge and systematizing the universe have been considered as, in
part, techniques for the achievement of basic safety in the world, or, for the intelligent man,
expressions of self-actualization. Also freedom of inquiry and expression have been discussed
as preconditions of satisfactions of the basic needs. True though these formulations may be,
they do not constitute definitive answers to the question as to the motivation role of curiosity,
learning, philosophizing, experimenting, etc. They are, at best, no more than partial answers.[p.
385]
This question is especially difficult because we know so little about the facts. Curiosity,
exploration, desire for the facts, desire to know may certainly be observed easily enough. The
fact that they often are pursued even at great cost to the individual's safety is an earnest of the
partial character of our previous discussion. In addition, the writer must admit that, though he
has sufficient clinical evidence to postulate the desire to know as a very strong drive in
intelligent people, no data are available for unintelligent people. It may then be largely a
function of relatively high intelligence. Rather tentatively, then, and largely in the hope of
stimulating discussion and research, we shall postulate a basic desire to know, to be aware of
reality, to get the facts, to satisfy curiosity, or as Wertheimer phrases it, to see rather than to be
blind.
This postulation, however, is not enough. Even after we know, we are impelled to know more
and more minutely and microscopically on the one hand, and on the other, more and more
extensively in the direction of a world philosophy, religion, etc. The facts that we acquire, if they
are isolated or atomistic, inevitably get theorized about, and either analyzed or organized or
both. This process has been phrased by some as the search for 'meaning.' We shall then
postulate a desire to understand, to systematize, to organize, to analyze, to look for relations
and meanings.
Once these desires are accepted for discussion, we see that they too form themselves into a
small hierarchy in which the desire to know is prepotent over the desire to understand. All the
characteristics of a hierarchy of prepotency that we have described above, seem to hold for this
one as well.
We must guard ourselves against the too easy tendency to separate these desires from the
basic needs we have discussed above, i.e., to make a sharp dichotomy between 'cognitive' and
'conative' needs. The desire to know and to understand are themselves conative, i.e., have a
striving character, and are as much personality needs as the 'basic needs' we have already
discussed (19).[p. 386]
III. FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASIC NEEDS
The degree of fixity of the hierarchy of basic needs. -- We have spoken so far as if this
hierarchy were a fixed order but actually it is not nearly as rigid as we may have implied. It is
true that most of the people with whom we have worked have seemed to have these basic
needs in about the order that has been indicated. However, there have been a number of
exceptions.
(1) There are some people in whom, for instance, self-esteem seems to be more important than
love. This most common reversal in the hierarchy is usually due to the development of the
notion that the person who is most likely to be loved is a strong or powerful person, one who
inspires respect or fear, and who is self confident or aggressive. Therefore such people who
lack love and seek it, may try hard to put on a front of aggressive, confident behavior. But
essentially they seek high self-esteem and its behavior expressions more as a means-to-an-
end than for its own sake; they seek self-assertion for the sake of love rather than for self-
esteem itself.
(2) There are other, apparently innately creative people in whom the drive to creativeness
seems to be more important than any other counter-determinant. Their creativeness might
appear not as self-actualization released by basic satisfaction, but in spite of lack of basic
satisfaction.
(3) In certain people the level of aspiration may be permanently deadened or lowered. That is
to say, the less pre-potent goals may simply be lost, and may disappear forever, so that the
person who has experienced life at a very low level, i. e., chronic unemployment, may continue
to be satisfied for the rest of his life if only he can get enough food.
(4) The