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experience before what she classifies as abjection. Kristeva makes the following comment
on abjection:
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed
against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected
beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite
close, but it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire,
which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Apprehensive, desire turns aside;
sickened, it rejects. [...]. But simultaneously, just the same, that impetus, that spasm,
that leap is drawn toward an elsewhere as tempting as it is condemned.
Unflaggingly, like an inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion
places the one haunted by it literally beside himself (Kristeva, 1982: 1).
Abjection has to do, then, with a repulsive reaction (horror, spasms, vomiting) to a
threat. What sort of threat? Kristeva goes on to say that abjection is that which “disturbs
identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules” (Kristeva, 1982: 4).
The abject disturbs the “I”’s sense of borders and boundaries by blurring the distinction
between what is self and what is not-self, or between self and other; abjection exists in the
liminal space between outside and inside. As Kristeva says, the abject infests reality from
beyond imaginary limits and finishes by devouring the self. The ambiguity of abjection is
partly strange and partly real, and because it so disturbs the self’s sense of order, it destroys
the self. To Kristeva, abjection is, thus, a safeguard of our identity. It is an attempt to
preserve a coherent and independent identity to ourselves and others against the
inconsistencies of the “in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (Kristeva, 1982: 4) in
our beings, which calls us back to our primal chaos in which we found ourselves before our
entrance into language and symbolic order. This erasing of boundaries depends on a fear of
a return, for something that has been rejected (abjectus= discarded, thrown off) can well
return from “beyond the scope of the possible”. To some extent, this relates to Freud’s
notion of the uncanny. The uncanny is anything we experience in adulthood that reminds us
of earlier psychic stages, of aspects of our unconscious life, or of the primitive experience
of the human species, and which arouses dread and horror. The feeling of uncanniness is,
therefore, derived not from something external but ––– on the contrary ––– from something
strangely familiar to us which becomes unfamiliar through a process of repression.
Kristeva’s abjection corresponds, then, to what Freud calls “the return of the repressed”, a