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The Theory of Value: A Reply to Professor Macvane
Friedrich Wieser
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science II
(1891-1892), pp. 600-28.
This paper has been prepared with the view of replying to the
objections raised by Professor Macvane(1*) to the theory of value
advanced by the Austrian school of economists. I regret that his
criticisms, although published nearly a year ago, have but
recently come to my notice. They are directed chiefly against
Bohm-Bawerk, and I shall therefore leave him to answer all such
points as immediately concern him and confine myself to the
relation between marginal utility and cost. The propositions of
the Austrian school in question were first advanced by me, and I
think I am therefore justified in taking part in the discussion
so far as they are concerned. Although I have heretofore avoided
every species of polemic with my critics, it is a pleasure to
cross swords with so chivalrous an opponent as Professor Macvane,
whose attack is so earnest that it must be parried, and whose
bearing is so courteous as to raise great hopes of a calm and
fruitful discussion.
Before beginning, however, I owe my readers the explanation
that the simple reply, first intended by me, has finally
developed into an extensive and independent essay. The roots of
the theory of value reach out into the field of economic theory,
and I believe that the discussion can be brought to a conclusion
only by extending it to these ramifications. Professor Macvane
will therefore pardon me for directing my polemic not only
against him, but above all, against Ricardo, on whose economic
conceptions he has based his arguments.
1. The Economic Theory of Ricardo
(1)
From the standpoint of Ricardo and his school, general
economic conditions can best be presented by describing the
economy of a hunter, or fisher, or some similar entirely
primitive kind of production. Human labor and nothing more is
expended to obtain "Commodities," i.e., means for support and
comfort. Economically, labor is measured by the effort involved,
the commodities by their value and utility. Value, is in the long
run, determined by the amount of labor expended, provisionally,
by the fluctuations of supply and demand affecting the utility.
The products and their value determine the reward of labor (the
income) which, like value, has a theory of its own.
Not only the primitive economy of the hunter but also the
modern political economy in its full development is reduced to
these simple elements. The richest means of production in land
and capital, after all, signify nothing else but labor, and have
their measure in personal effort, the value of products being
ultimately determined by this effort. The theory of value is,
however, limited to commodities, while, on the other hand, the
theory of distribution is extended so as to include the relations
of land and capital. At the same time, in discussing interest and
rent (as in discussing the functions of capital, etc.), the
simplicity of these economic principles is destroyed by a large
number of resulting internal contradictions. Out of the conflict
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between the necessity of working and the dislike of work on
account of the exertion required, arises the economic tendency to
reduce as much as possible the necessary effort. This also
explains the meaning of the economic balance-sheet. All its
figures, however complicated they be, represent, as a rule,
quantities of labor, or, more exactly, quantities of effort
expended. In the long run the value of commodities is determined
by the exertion which is saved owing to their existence. This
determines the value credited to them on the economic balance
sheet. Properly, wealth is labor saved.
According to the Austrian school, the economic 1ife results
from a different conflict. It is the conflict between the
abundance desired by man and the scanty means, continually liable
to be reduced, offered for his satisfaction. The struggle against
the "too little," the demand for "more" and "much" rears the
economic structure. For what other reason should poverty be
feared and wealth desired? Wealth is utility or satisfaction
secured, poverty the want of it. It is characteristic that
Ricardo admits the idea of scarcity in the case of a few
commodities only, rarities of all kinds. Of the large number of
commodities remaining he says expressly: "They may be
multiplied... almost without any assignable limit, if we are
disposed to bestow the labor necessary to obtain them." We, on
the other hand, start with the supposition that only in a few
cases abundance is secured, while in all other cases commodities
are too scarce and production has its concrete limits. According
to our view, utility is the purpose of economic 1ife. Whatever
increases utility has value, and as much value as utility is
increased. Accordingly, not only commodities have value, but the
means of production as well, if they secure products as articles
of consumption which otherwise could not have been supplied. For
their value is measured by the increase of utility obtained in
this way. This is true of land, capital, and also of labor. Labor
has value owing to what it produces and the greater value the
more it produces.
The definition of value as proposed by our school, is,
therefore, comprehensive, since it includes not only commodities
but the means of production as well. It is also monistic since it
bases itself on utility alone and does not in a dualistic way
refer now to utility and now to labor. In our opinion, the same
law regulates the temporary fluctuations of value due to supply
and demand and its normal level. It is true that cost also
exercises an influence on value. There is nothing however in cost
which demands a peculiar explanation. The law of cost is but a
special modification of the general law of value based upon
"marginal utility."
It is beyond my present purpose to show that we intend to
give greater extension and uniformity to the theory of value in
another direction, by trying to combine the ideas of value in
exchange and value in use.
The opinion which Professor Macvane expresses in regard to
our theory is, notwithstanding his complimentary tone, highly
unfavorable. He denies that it presents "a fundamental law of
value," and thinks it, at best, a new and "less convenient" form
of the familiar principle of demand and supply. In his view we
only make some contributions to the explanation of the
fluctuations of value which follow utility though supply and
demand, but nothing to the "broad and permanent features" of
value as determined by labor. If this criticism were true we
should consider our efforts to be a failure. We tried, above all,
to abolish the dualism of labor and utility, that combination of
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irreconcilable causes, which only proves that the true cause has
not yet been recognized. We also wished to bridge over the chasm
which yawns between the theory of value and that of distribution,
and especially of interest. We hoped that a broad, clear current
of theory might reflect the whole economic structure.
If, instead of fulfilling this purpose, we had only rectified
a detail in Ricardo's system, and in this way supplemented the
latter, we should have, in my opinion, only increased the evil
which we intended to cure. If I rightly understand Professor
Macvane's criticism, I think that he judges our theory too much
from the standpoint of the Ricardian theory of value, in the
light of which it is necessarily erroneous. I believe that this
is the only reason why he has misunderstood us in essential
points. At least every reader of his criticism must misunderstand
us. Although I wish my answer to be brief, I must, nevertheless,
commence with the discussion of some propositions of economic
theory and since the most successful way of defence is offensive,
I shall begin by attacking my opponent. First I shall endeavor to
refute the proposition that all costs may be reduced to labor.
(2)
The critic can only judge what he understands; nay, he must
even understand it better than he whom he criticizes. I must
frankly confess, however, that in the case under discussion I
cannot fulfill this first condition of all criticism. I really do
not understand the assertion that all costs may be reduced to
labor, or, at least, it is so strange to me that I cannot
conceive how anyone can maintain it. With regard to this view I
am much in the position of the ordinary man, who absolutely and
resolutely believes in the reality of things of the outer world
in opposition to that philosophical view which regards all
physical objects which surround us as only apparent, the
fictitious creations of our imaginations. He cannot rid himself
of the idea that he can grasp and hold the things. Whatever the
philosopher may say in favor of his view, may inspire him with
awe and wonder, and, perhaps, with some kind of admiration, but
never with clear insight. I am in entirely the same condition
when it is asserted that raw material, coal, and machinery could
all be completely expressed in terms of labor. Their shapes are
too real to me, too concrete to permit me to put an abstraction
in their place. I am well aware that the theory which maintains
that everything is created by human labor, really implies human
labor in connection with the soil of our earth and the other
powers of nature. It does not pretend that man creates goods out
of nothing. It is only the capital used in production, the means
of production created by human civilization, that is to say, the
result of human work in a general sense, which it is sought to
reduce to labor. I certainly do not object to the assertion that
capital is the result of human labor in a general way, but if it
is taken literally and means that capital is labor, it must be
frankly confessed, I can no longer follow the argument in my
thought. I say this with perfect sincerity, and with no shadow of
irony. I wish to call the attention of my opponent to the fact
that I am here obliged to ignore that which proves a decisive
argument to him and to so many other distinguished thinkers. I
must say that nothing has made me so doubtful during my study of
value as the consciousness, oppressing me like a fault, that I am
not able to follow the thought which, in one form or another,
appears in the writings of the majority of those who have dealt
with economic theory.
I cannot help suspecting that the theoretical writers so
eagerly endeavor to eliminate capital from the cost-account
because they are not able to explain the part which it plays. The
reasoning by means of which the value of the products of labor is
derived from the exertion involved in their production only
includes those efforts which are felt, and not the inanimate
capital. The theorist can come to no practical conclusion
regarding capital as a part of the cost of production
(Kapitalkosten), and, therefore, it must disappear. Of course
those who commit this oversight are not conscious of it; they
only forget, quite naturally, what is unpleasant to contemplate.
Theorists can more easily yield to this instinct of human nature
than practical men who are accustomed to feel the opposition of
facts. The former may do so the more easily where there exists
among them a silent agreement that none of them shall mention the
disturbing fact. Such an agreement, it seems to me, exists in the
English-American literature with regard to the part which capital
plays in the cost-account.
The attempt has often been made to eliminate the inconvenient
item of capital from the cost-account and to substitute labor for
it. In my opinion this has been done most ingeniously by some
Socialistic writers, whose explanation I cannot discuss in this
place. Besides the above, two lines of argument have usually been
taken. It is either asserted that capital is historically gained
though labor, and, if the co-operation of natural forces is left
out of consideration, through labor alone; or it is said that
even to-day, with our modern methods of production, capital is
originated by labor, and, subject to the mentioned limitation, by
labor alone. In both views the cost of the production of capital
reduced to labor is substituted for capital; on the former
hypothesis it is the cost which has been involved in accumulating
capital from the beginning of economic history, in the latter the
outlay which is necessary to reproduce the capital consumed.
I will not discuss here how far it is at all possible to
estimate the value of a quantity of goods by its cost. I will
only point out that with regard to the extent to which cost
should he considered in determining value, a certain limitation
must he made in theory and practice, namely, that only the
necessary or reasonable expenditure shall be taken into account,
but not an excess of cost due to an accident. Careless, wasteful,
or unskilled labor, which has been employed in excess of what is
demanded in an improved mode of production can never enter into
the value of the product. Only that amount can come into account
which is absolutely necessary for reproducing a commodity, i.e.,
that which is reasonable according to our present mode of
production.
Accordingly, it is evident that the process of originating
and accumulating capital, which has been carried on for thousands
of years, cannot enter as a factor in determining value. By far
the greater part of the exertion by means of which mankind has,
in the course of time, acquired this capital, might have been
saved, if, from the beginning, the best processes had been known,
the greatest industry had been applied, if nothing had been
squandered, and especially nothing had been destroyed though
violence and war. Only that part of the cost should be reckoned
in, which, according to the present condition of things, would be
absolutely necessary for reproducing the productive capital
already in existence. If new capital were to be produced, it
being claimed that capital should be reduced to labor, it would
seem but reasonable to produce it entirely by means of labor,
without artificial help and without drawing to our aid any other
capital. But who manufactures machines to-day otherwise than by
means of machines? Who can do any work to-day without raw
material or tools? Nowhere in our modern economy is capital
produced by labor alone. Everywhere the new capital is the
descendant of previously existing capital. By no form of
computation can the factor "capital" be eliminated from the cost
of capital.
To the assertion that the quantity of labor invested in the
gradual accumulation of capital in the past determines the value
of capital, I reply that this historical process is of no
significance for the present valuation, even if it should be true
that aside from the free natural forces, nothing but labor had
been invested in capital from the first. To the assertion that
the quantity of labor necessary for the present reproduction of
consumed capital be decisive, I reply that, at present, capital
can no longer be reproduced by new labor without the co-operation
of already existing capital.
In his "Working Principles," Professor Macvane presents an
exact analysis of the costs of producing paper in a large
factory. In passing, I will note that one-fifth of the entire
cost in cash is paid for wages -- for absolute labor, the rest,
four-fifths of the whole, is expended for machines, raw material,
etc. Professor Macvane then continues: "But a little study of the
matter enables us to see that the sums paid for machinery,
materials, etc., are, in fact, mainly payments of wages in
disguise. These sums replace (with a profit) to other employers
the wages paid for the production of the machinery, materials,
etc." But is this true? The cost-account of the other employers
shows again the same state of affairs; only a part of their money
expenditure goes for wages, another part, never insignificant and
often very considerable, is spent in the acquisition of
materials, etc. Each actual cost-account contains items of
capital. What right has a theory to ignore them?
I know it is customary to state the matter as if capital, as
an item of cost, only appeared in the cost-account as a result of
the division of production among several or many producers. The
paper manufacturer who buys his machines from the machine
manufacturer, necessarily believes that he acquires capital,
while in reality he only buys the fruit of labor, i.e., labor. If
all concerns were united under one management, it would be
evident at first glance that there was no original expenditure in
production besides that of simple labor.
To a certain length I willingly follow this argument, in so
far as it concerns newly manufactured half-products which one
employer sells to another for the purpose of further elaboration.
On the other hand, I regard it as entirely false so far as it
concerns capital produced in earlier economic periods, which have
long ago elapsed. If poor fishermen during the winter produce a
net out of materials which nature furnishes them gratuitously,
they create something which is paid for in summer by the fish
which they catch by means of it. Their labor is first transformed
into the net and then into the fish. Formerly the scanty tools
were, perhaps, nothing more than rapidly-passing, transitional
forms of human labor which embodied itself, only finally to
resolve itself into the finished product, the creation of which
was facilitated by this means. The distinction between such a
primitive mode of production and the modern one lies in the fact
that the capital-power employed in the latter is incomparably
greater than that which, in the way just described, can be gained
though direct transformation of labor into capital. It would not
only be irrational, awkward, and expensive in any productive
process to-day to begin ab ovo to create the requisite capital by
means of labor alone, but it would even be impossible to attain
the national income, or even a noteworthy faction of it in this
way. We owe the goods which we consume not only to our industry,
but also to the capital which we have inherited from our
ancestors, together with Labor and Nature. This inherited
capital-by the help of which we begin every process of
production, without exception-must be considered as an
independent and indispensable factor in our production, which can
be as little ignored as it can be dispensed with.
The proposition that capital is an indispensable factor in
production has nothing novel in it to one versed in economic
theory. It is discussed in every text-book of political economy
in connection with production and its conditions. Professor
Macvane also proves it in its proper place, in his "Working
Principles" (chap. vii.), and he calls (chap. viii., p. 69.) "the
capital of to-day a legacy." He informs his readers that "to
those who already have capital, increase is comparatively easy.
With the old tools new ones can be made." But if, in the same
text-hooks and systems, we turn from the chapter on production to
that on value-capital has disappeared. With regard to value,
Professor Macvane classifies all cost into "labor" and "waiting,"
as others classify cost into labor and abstinence. In this
classification capital, as such, has vanished. Only the following
alternative is possible: Either capital has no existence whatever
in the eyes of the political economist who reduces it to labor --
it exists only in the mind of the layman -- and in the discussion
of production it should only be mentioned as a transitional stage
of labor: Or capital has also to be recognized by science, its
value must be discussed, its place assigned in the cost-account,
and the influence estimated which it exercises on value, together
with labor.
Every practical employer is constantly intent on arriving at
a clear statement of his cost-account, including capital. Without
it his book-keeping would he regarded as very incomplete. Imagine
the manager of a large business who is engaged in drawing up a
statement of his earnings and running expenses becoming puzzled
in his calculations respecting his investments, discounts, a
possible fall in value, etc. Let him try to inform himself about
the meaning and significance of his calculations by reading
theoretical works on value. What a surprise it would be to him
not to find any information about these operations, but discover
that everywhere capital is identified with labor. At first he may
perhaps be in doubt whether his calculations are without sense,
or the theory without use, but soon he will decide that the
latter is the case. It would certainly be no sufficient
theoretical explanation of value, if merely the practical
valuations, as they are generally made, were repeated. It is
necessary that theory should rise above practice, especially
above the individual case. But on the other hand, it would be
entirely out of place to give a theory of value which should
entirely ignore practical views of value and their origin. The
physician who studies the diseases of the human body regards the
testimony of the patient only as hints and suggestions, which he
knows often enough mislead, his real object is the silent body
itself. To the political economist, who studies the problem of
value, the practical valuations are more than symptoms, they are
the thing itself. It is his task to unfold their meaning, to
state it in a more comprehensible, clear and complete form than
the practical man could do it; but certainly not in a way which
leaves entirely the sphere of economic experience.
(3)
Professor Macvane is right in supposing that the Austrian
economists would reject the explanation of value based
exclusively on exertion, even if it were true that the cost of
capital could be reduced in every case to the cost of labor. We
have a number of further objections, and we do not stand alone in
this respect. They have been raised over and over again. It will
suffice to mention one of them, which seems to me to be the most
important in the principle underlying it.
According to the labor theory, labor should be estimated and
paid in proportion to the effort and danger which it involves.
The most painful and dangerous efforts would accordingly have the
highest value. It is impossible to draw a different conclusion
from the labor theory. And now let every reader ask himself
whether experience affirms the supposition that the most painful
and dangerous labor really receives the highest wages. I believe
even he who professes the labor theory will be compelled to grant
that experience contradicts his theory, and that he would gladly
be relieved of the necessity of proving that this contradiction
is only apparent, and that experience really supports his view.
I, at least, do not envy the theorist, who is forced of necessity
to attempt such an explanation. It is certain that from a mere
observation of wages nobody could have conceived the idea that
the value of labor is determined by the hardship involved.
Confronted by this obstacle, Professor Macvane exhibits a
degree of sincerity and sagacity which does him honor. He does
not, like many others, simply skip the subject, without having
given an explanation, but he discusses it thoroughly. He says (p.
98 of his "Principles") that the opinion of the laborers
themselves as to what is painful or dangerous -- be his opinion
justifiable or not -- must he decisive in estimating the effort
and danger of labor. "What they think hard or dangerous, or
disagreeable, is, for our present purposes, hard or dangerous, or
disagreeable; what they think easy and pleasant, is easy and
pleasant." This thought would lead to the conclusion that every
one who is satisfied with certain wages for a certain effort,
while others receive higher wages for less effort, would thereby
silently admit that he regarded his effort as the less painful. I
do not know whether Professor Macvane intends to go so far. It
would not appear difficult to one apt in dialectics to present
arguments in favor of Professor Macvane's interpretation; but all
artifices of dialectics will prove nothing against the silent
sighs which accompany the hard labor of the poor.
How would the manufacturer answer the question; by what
standard does he grade the payment of wages? Without doubt he
would say, according to the skill of the workmen and the services
which they render him in his business. He will confess, that in
certain cases, when he requires increased efforts, he will he
obliged to increase wages in proportion, but he will not indicate
exertion as the absolute standard by which he grades labor. He
will he compelled to increase the wages of the laborer who has a
secured income, in order to induce him to undertake harder work,
while, on the other hand, he only needs to offer starvation wages
to the laborer who only has the choice between earning nothing
and submitting to the heaviest work for the meagerest wages. It
can only be said with exactness that labor can be had for the
mere remuneration of its effort in case an abundant supply of it
is at hand.
(4)
Ricardo, and those who deduce value from labor, advance what
at bottom amounts to the following argument: If a certain
expenditure of labor, though relatively very small, must be made
for the sake of obtaining useful things, each of these things has
value or importance, simply because by the possession of the
article labor is saved; the measure of value is not to be found
in the utility of the article created, but in the often
comparatively small quantity of labor though the sacrifice of
which the article in question can always be reproduced. If the
articles of utility could really be regularly obtained though a
sacrifice of labor, his theory would be tenable. It would be
necessary that any supply of commodities could be reproduced by
means of the naturally free sources of production through more
effort. In other words, we should expect that every one would be
justified in consuming as much as would be the equivalent of the
sacrifice of labor which he was willing to make. No satisfaction
should be denied to him who is willing to work for it.
Unfortunately, human labor cannot thus produce commodities
indefinitely. In the first place, in order to make labor
fruitful, we need capital in addition; and secondly, there is not
always a sufficient quantity of labor available to carry on every
kind of production which might be desired. The Ricardian theory
of value is faulty, because the theory of economics which it
presupposes is faulty. Its premises regarding economic facts are
wrong, while the reasoning by means of which it deduces
conclusions from these false premises is unassailable. Its
reasoning as such is absolutely convincing and hence the
exceedingly great logical attraction which it has exercised, and
continues to exercise, on so many people in spite of its evident
opposition to facts. The conception of value at which this theory
arrives, although clear and attractive, cannot be applied to our
economic conditions. Not less so the law of value, which, it may
be remarked in passing, has a very close inner affinity with the
law of marginal utility; and in general, however strange it may
sound, Ricardo's conception of value is very nearly related to
that of value in use. No other anterior theory has shed so much
light on the inner working of the economic world.
In my opinion, the part which this theory has played in the
historical development of the doctrine of value, can best be
characterized by comparing it to the "extensive" or primitive
cultivation of land. Under a few striking half truths it buries
the absolute truth which lies deeper. In its simplicity and force
it satisfies the first primitive demand for explanation. But
progressing science will necessarily formulate a more "intensive"
theory, which will set forth a higher truth, although with a
large expenditure of explanatory effort. Even if we overlook the
fact that entirely different economic conditions must be
presupposed -- a limited, instead of a plentiful supply of
commodities -- it is, nevertheless, necessary to examine the
value of the means of production in connection with the value of
the products. Even if it were true, that all means of production
could be reduced to labor, it would be necessary to examine the
value of labor. Professor Macvane says "that the relation of
product to exertion is that of reward, and reward only." He
evidently thinks that with regard to labor, only the returns --
the income, should he considered, and not the value. But
experience seems to prove the contrary. Wherever a return is
yielded, the aim appears to he primarily to determine the value
of the sources of this return. Everywhere value is used as a clue
to pass from the fruits which have value to the economic means of
production which yield the fruits, however numerous or distantly
related they may be. Is not this the daily business of the
exchange? With the same money, means of production and
commodities are paid for in proportion to their value, and are
exchanged accordingly. We cannot therefore avoid the conclusion
that both are embraced in the same conception of value. If
Professor Macvane asks why the Austrian School attributes value
to the means of production, to those goods which form a part of
the costs, I can only answer: We do it because it is done
everywhere, without exception, in economic life.
2. Cost and Marginal Utility
(5)
Ricardo's explanation of value presupposes that the whole
process of production would admit of a uniform valuation
according to the feeling of personal exertion, and that such a
valuation is actually carried on every day. It regards this
apparatus as one immense body conscious of its efforts. The
Austrian School seeks the uniform measure for estimating the
vaLue of the means of production and of the commodities, in the
utility which they both create. Men consider as primarily useful
the means of subsistence and those other commodities which
directly satisfy personal wants; in a secondary sense also, all
means of production by which the former are obtained, in
proportion as these means aid in the production. Can one imagine
a more natural, simple and conclusive conception of the utility
of commodities? It is true it is not inherent utility which
political economy takes as the standard of valuation. The most
useful things are often entirely without value in the economic
world. Nobody has recognized this fact more clearly than Ricardo,
and I believe that in the history of the theory of value it will
be held as the lasting merit of his school to have revealed the
opposition between value and utility. But his school committed a
mistake in overestimating this opposition and in making it a
complete contradiction, while in reality there exists a close
logical relation between the two conceptions.
Articles which have utility have value only on the condition
that they cannot at all times be obtained in any desired
quantity. Certainly even in the midst of the abundance of
Paradise satisfaction may he secured and has value as such, but
the value of satisfaction will not be transferred to the thing
which satisfies, because another article can always be obtained
in its stead which will give the same satisfaction. The idea of
value extends to commodities only when they cannot be had in an
abundance which would satisfy all possible demands. The idea of
the importance of property only originates in scarcity.
Even in the case where goods are not obtainable in abundance,
they are not estimated by the total utility which they possess,
but generally only by a part of it. The law which determines this
quantity of utility has been called the law of marginal utility
by the Austrian School. The content of this law is shortly
expressed as follows: A commodity is not valued according to the
utility which it actually possesses, but by that degree of
utility only which is dependent upon that particular commodity,
i.e., that degree of utility which could not be enjoyed without
possessing the commodity in question. One who has an annual
income of ten thousand guldens and wants to spend it, let us say
in a thousand different ways, will not estimate the gulden which
he is going to spend for the most necessary article according to
its importance, but according to the importance of the least
necessary of the thousand articles to be acquired, for only the
latter would not be obtained if this one gulden should be lost.
The law of marginal utility, if rightly understood, includes
the law of cost. I must therefore beg the reader's permission to
develop somewhat minutely our views on this point.
(6)
The degree of utility possessed by the means of production
depends entirely upon the degree of utility of the commodities
produced by means of them and is based upon this. Indeed, in
principle, these two qualities are mathematically equal,
excepting perhaps that difference which is expressed in the rate
of the discount and which may be neglected here. According to the
view taken by the Austrian School the estimation of value should
begin like the estimation of utility, upon which it is based,
with the products, and proceed thence to the means of production.
The consequence of this is that the utility and value of the
means of production prove to be no more identical than the
utility and value of the products. Thus, for example, the value
of the harvests is usually estimated much lower than its total
utility, and consequently the value of the large productive group
represented by land, agricultural capital and labor must be
correspondingly less than their total utility. Of course the
value of the products only extends to such means of production as
are not to be had in indefinite quantities. Labor, likewise,
receives its share of value wherever it has helped in producing
and cannot be obtained in unlimited quantities.
It is not at all necessary to take into account the
arduousness of the labor in order to explain its value. Under the
supposed conditions value would be accorded to labor even if it
involved no expenditure of effort whatever. In principle,
therefore, the value of the commodities and the value of the
means of production are identical and the former forms the basis
of the latter. But what is cost? And how is it that in observing
economic life we receive the distinct impression that the means
of production regarded as cost determine the value of the
product?
Nobody will doubt that the value of a mineral spring which
serves no other purpose than that of furnishing water for
drinking, receives its value from the utility which is attributed
to the water, and that it loses its value so soon as this ceases
to be esteemed. In the same way iron or coal or common labor
derives its value from the utility of the commodities produced
with its help. If the contrary appears to be true and the latter
appear to derive their value from the expenditure of the former,
this can only be due to the fact that the applications of iron or
coal or common labor are so exceedingly manifold. Their value is
only determined by the totality of what they produce. A single
product may, however, contribute nothing observable to this
value. If a small mill fails or a household disappears and coal
is no longer consumed by them, the effect on the market is
practically inappreciable. If the value of the means of
production be actually compared with that of their individual
products, the former will be considered as the stable, permanent
and significant element, the latter as fluctuating and
subordinate. The value of the iron reflects that of the
commodities produced from it, but owing to the fact that the
former concentrates, so to speak, all the rays as in a focus, its
illuminating power is greater than that of any single ray.
But this is not all. The practical capitalist only theorizes
so far as seems absolutely necessary. He would never make such a
comparison of the value of the means of production with that of
the products unless compelled by circumstances. Every capitalist
must in his own interest adapt his business to the general
conditions of the market, if he wants it to maintain itself
profitably. So far as he resorts to means of production which
have other applications as well, he finds that they have a given
value. He must pay for them, and the value of the goods which he
produces must replace this expenditure. In this sense he has to
adapt the value of the commodities to the value of the means of
production. Thus originates the conception of cost. Cost consists
in means of production having manifold applications, like iron,
coal, and common labor, which even when they are employed in the
production of a single commodity, are still estimated according
to the value which they have in all their applications. The
hundreds and thousands of different kinds of materials and tools
prepared for production are counted, weighed, and measured
according to the utility which they are to create, and in view of
their importance most zealously guarded by their possessors. In
the same way the different kinds of labor are assorted according
to the utility expected from them, and arranged according to a
classification which differs essentially from that which would
result if the effort involved should be taken into consideration.
The unlimited possession of useful productive materials and
forces forms the basis of the economic confidence of modern
society. Since each productive process diminishes this
possession, it reduces utility-it costs, and it costs exactly as
much as the value which the material and labor required would
have produced if rationally applied. It is evident that a
consideration of the cost does not, in the view taken above,
produce the value of the commodities. The capitalist cannot in
any way base upon the expenses he has incurred a successful claim
that his customers should pay a price which would cover this
outlay. The buyers pay according to their valuation of the
commodities. The consideration of the cost has primarily only the
effect of influencing the supply continually put on the market by
the producers. Based upon the supply on the market (which is
determined as above indicated), the value of the commodities
continues to depend upon their utility, and the fact remains
unshaken that this utility finally determines the value of means
of production. At the sale of the products the capitalists
continually rectify their calculations, and according to their
gains or losses the value of the means of production increases or
diminishes in their estimation. They contribute each in his own
way and according to the measure of his influence, to maintain or
alter the market-value of the means of production, which
constancy regulates the wheels of industry.
There are, however, cases where, without influencing the
quantity of the production, the cost directly determines the
value of the commodities. It must suffice here to illustrate this
by a single example. Suppose the railroad system of a country to
be completed, and consequently the annual demand for rails is
limited to that quantity which is required to replace the wear
and tear. Let us suppose, furthermore, that the value of iron,
owing to an immense increase in the production of that metal,
considerably decreases -- what will be the effect on the value of
rails? Their utility does not apparently change, nor the quantity
produced, nevertheless their value will decrease for the very
reason that the cost has lessened, and exactly so far as the cost
has lessened. If the production of rails were monopolized, the
former price could be maintained, and the fact that the rails had
decrease in value would only come into account in the internal
production. Free competition, however, will compel the producer
to adapt the price to the rectified valuation and to allow the
consumers to participate in the reduction of the value.
Without further analyzing these cases, mentioned as
illustrations, I shall only show their general theoretical
importance. We have here to do with a new application of the "law
of marginal utility." The utility of the rails no longer depends
upon their possession nor even upon their marginal utility, but
only upon the still lower marginal utility of the material,
labor, etc., which are requisite for their production. The value
of these materials, labor, etc., is determined by that of
commodities having a still lower marginal utility than the rails,
for example, ordinary tools. The value of rails is therefore
determined: (1) by the quantities of iron, etc., required; and
(2) by the utility which these have in their most unimportant
application in other productive processes. Although the rails do
not owe their value to their utility, they owe it to some kind of
utility-primarily to that of the means of production employed;
finally to the marginal utility of certain other commodities. In
the cases in question, the value of commodities is not estimated
"specifically," but the commodities are regarded as compounds of
their productive elements, of several factors, to each of which a
certain value is ascribed. The rails represent a certain amount
of iron and labor, and are so estimated. Where large supplies of
finished commodities are at hand which are sufficient to satisfy
the most urgent demands and which are always supplemented by
reproduction, this kind of valuation becomes quite general. It is
the prevailing one in every well regulated form of production.
Commodities in the manufacture of which different quantities of
like elements are employed, are valued in the same ratio as
these, that is to say, the quantities of the means of production
required determine the relative value. From this arises the
natural impression that they determine the value of commodities
in general, and one forgets that it is necessary to seek for the
absolute value. It is not sufficient to know what quantities of
iron are required for certain commodities, but it is necessary as
well to know the absolute value of the iron, and this is finally
determined by the value of the products manufactured out of it.
If, however, supply and demand are too seriously interfered with
it is no longer possible to estimate the products by the value of
the means of production. They are then estimated as "specific
goods," that is, rails as rails. Then the utility, i.e., the
marginal utility of the rails determines their value. After the
disturbance has ceased and production has again become regular,
commodities are once more valued according to their cost, which
is in turn, as has been shown, nothing but a complicated form of
value in use.
Thus utility is always the decisive element, and, according
to the same law, it is the marginal utility which is decisive.
Circumstances, however, change in such a way that now a direct,
now an indirect, now the specific, now an external utility
constitutes the marginal utility. The Austrian School does not in
any way destroy the idea of cost or the law of cost, it only
endeavors to combine both with the general idea of value and its
general law, and to explain them in this way. Our hope is to get
beyond the old scholastic controversy, whether value is
determined by cost, or, conversely, cost by value.
(7)
Professor Macvane rejects our conception of the influence of
cost on value. He says: "It seems to involve a begging of the
question." "The principle of cost," he continues, "is too broad
to be admitted, by a side door, or as an afterthought. If the
reason why coats have a higher value than shoes be that coats
have a greater final utility, that ought to be the end of the
story. To add, as an incidental circumstance, that coats are also
more difficult to make and so ought to have a higher value, has
the appearance of putting the controlling factor in a curiously
subordinate place." I cannot quite understand this objection made
against us. I find that it is not our view which he criticizes.
We do not admit the principle of cost by a side door, but, on the
contrary, it is admitted without secrecy through the main portal
of our theory. One principle is that value is derived from
utility, and quite in harmony with this principle, we assert that
cost is, after all, according to the general law of value, that
of marginal utility, measured by utility alone.
But it should not be overlooked as, in my opinion, has been
done by Professor Macvane, that, in speaking of utility (and
marginal utility), we purposely put "the end of the story" a
little further back than Ricardo and the Ricardians. In the case
of the coat, as in the case of any other commodity, utility must
be considered in two ways: First, in so far as it is useful
itself; and, secondly, in so far as utility is attributed to the
labor, materials, etc., by means of which it is produced and by
means of which, at the same time, other commodities are produced.
If, at a given moment, the marginal utility of coats equals one
hundred, while the other commodities produced with the same means
of production, and consequently the requisite means of production
themselves, have a marginal utility of fifty, the result will be
an endeavor to produce more coats. Now since the manufacture of
these means a profitable utilization of the means of production,
this endeavor will continue until, by the increase of quantity,
the marginal utility of coats has likewise been reduced to fifty.
Then the value of the commodity and of the materials will become
identical, and not, indeed, by any accident, but by the
intentional realization of the most essential functions of
economic life. But it may also happen that so many coats cannot
be used, and consequently that an increase of production is not
called for. Coats will then maintain the value one hundred as
directly estimated by their marginal utility. But even in this
case their value will ultimately equal fifty or the cost-value,
if, at this value, they can be constantly and uninterruptedly
placed upon the market. This result, also, will not be
accidental, but the result of the general law of value-the "law
of marginal utility." Goods are not valued according to the
utility which they themselves possess when a lower utility is
dependent upon them, but according to this lower utility. In the
given case a man who loses his coat does not lose the utility of
one hundred, but only of fifty, which the requisite means of
production would have yielded if applied in other ways. This
utility is the marginal one and decisive for value.
(8)
"I am unable to conceive," Professor Macvane says, "of the
attribute of exchange value as belonging to the cost of products.
That would be to regard producers as carrying on a kind of
exchange with nature, giving productive exertions in return for
commodities.... But this way of looking at things does not seem
to promise very useful results."
I have already said that the Austrians recognize the value of
the means of production because they observe that it is
recognized everywhere in economic life. We believe that it is our
task to explain value wherever we may find it. The theorist may
always be sure that value, wherever it is found, has a meaning.
The actual calculation of the economic world constitutes an
unsurpassable work of art in which nothing is isolated or
unconnected, and it is not completely grasped by theory so long
as anything in it seems to be without connection with the other
portions of the system. It is, in my opinion, not at all
impossible to explain the meaning which lies in the customary
valuation of the means of production and the cost-account based
upon it. It is a fact of highest importance that the value of
productive property and of productive powers anticipates the
expected value of the commodities. It is in consequence of this
fact that if productive materials and forces are employed in
production and are thus either converted into fixed capital or
consumed, we are continually admonished that the full value of
the fruits expected must be derived from them. In this way, in
the valuation of the means of production, the future commodities
have already been taken into account. Their production is planned
with the purpose of attaining the highest possible utility and is
carried out with this end in view.
It is especially important to aim at the most advantageous
utilization of those means of production which allow a manifold
application. In order that the highest possible utility be
obtained from them it is necessary to balance all their
applications against each other. A condition of equilibrium must
be established. Too much must not be manufactured of one product
and too little of another, for otherwise the necessary would be
sacrificed to the superfluous and the highest attainable utility
would not be reached. It seems that without exact statistics of
supply and demand production must proceed in the dark and often
mistake its way. If, nevertheless, as is shown by experience, the
right proportion between the different kinds of production is
generally maintained, although the statistics are not exact and
are often entirely wanting, it is due to the circumstance that
another expedient presents itself, viz., to consult the value of
the means of production as determined by the relation of supply
and demand in the past. Every producer strives to manufacture
that quantity of goods which will cause the value of the
commodities to replace at least the value of the means of
production. His own interests demand this, for the means of
production are his outlay which must be restored to him in the
shape of the commodities produced. At the same time he renders,
unconsciously, a great economic service, he helps to regulate
production so that a general equilibrium results and the means of
production yield the greatest possible utility.
"To count the cost" means in a single case to estimate the
value of the means of production, having a manifold application,
by that value which results from the totality of their
applications. The outcome of the fact that the value is thus
estimated in each single case is, that the means of production
are distributed in such a way with regard to the commodities that
the highest possible utility is attained.
This fact also explains why the endeavor is continually made
to re-adjust the disturbances of production above mentioned which
cause commodities to be valued for a time according to their
"specific utility", instead of according to their cost. Hence the
valuation according to "cost" implies the just and most efficient
distribution of the means of production among all the various
kinds of productions; the valuation according to "utility," on
the other hand, indicates a disturbance, owing to which one
branch of production is isolated from the other branches and
consequently the equilibrium is destroyed.
It is primarily the individual capitalist who makes his
calculation according to cost in his own interest. Free
competition, however, compels him to apply the same calculation
in selling to his customers and in this way to give to
consumption that extent which corresponds to the production.
(9)
I now come to that part of Professor Macvane's criticism
which, while it deals apparently only with a single detail,
involves in reality the most comprehensive conclusions.
The Austrian School explains exchange by the value in use;
each party to the exchange endeavors to gain in value in use. If
the commodities parted with have a value in use of ten, the
article received in exchange must necessarily have a higher value
than ten in order that the exchange may take place. In the case
of the other party to the exchange the valuation will be
reversed; here a higher value is attached to that which received
a lower estimate in the first instance.
Professor Macvane is right in showing that under the
supremacy of the division of labor the products very frequently,
if not generally, have no value in use at all to the producer who
wants to sell them. He thinks that our theory has not taken this
fact into account. But in this he is quite mistaken. We have
taken it into account, and it is in complete harmony with our
theory of exchange.
Although the commodity has no value in use to the seller, yet
the price which he receives has an indirect value in use to him,
since it enables him to buy goods of direct value in use. On this
account he is influenced by those motives which, in our opinion,
lead to the exchange. We presuppose a difference between the
value in use of the article received and that of the article
given in exchange. This difference does not disappear when the
article given in exchange has a value in use equal to zero, but
rather reaches its maximum in this case.
It is proper to emphasize in this place that the Ricardian
theory offers no explanation of exchange. According to Ricardo,
articles of equal cost have equal value; what inducement is there
to exchange articles of equal value? It is evident that the
parties to the exchange are influenced by some consideration of
the utility of the goods exchanged. But utility as such does not
lead to economic transactions. Nobody pays for the useful air,
nobody pays for victuals in proportion to their total utility. In
order to explain exchange, it is necessary to determine the real
economic measure of utility: that measure the Austrians believe
they have found in the idea of marginal utility. In this way the
idea of marginal utility may enter the breach which the Ricardian
theory of exchange leaves open. If it succeed in this, the former
theory will, I am convinced, suffer a signal and complete defeat.
(10)
The point above discussed, leads Professor Macvane to the
final principles of political economy. According to him, the
Ricardian theory clearly reveals the fundamental plan of the
economic world. It is the endeavor of each individual to obtain
the greatest possible result by the least possible effort; and
thus he makes the best application of his powers. Division of
labor and free competition make it possible that the endeavor of
each individual should redound to the advantage of society; so
that finally the maximum of general advantage is attained by the
minimum expenditure of general effort.
Professor Macvane thinks that on account of its erroneous
conception of the motives of exchange our theory does not serve
to explain the movements of this economic mechanism. I have just
shown that the conditions produced by the division of labor are
the same which we presuppose for exchange. Whatever may be said
in favor of division of labor and free competition, as an
explanation of the fact that the individual is compelled to work
in the interest of society, can also be said of our theory of
value and exchange.
I even maintain that the explanation of this process from the
standpoint of the Ricardian theory is not by far as clear as that
reached from our standpoint. Ricardo's theory does not in any way
contain an explanation of exchange. In general, a theory can only
explain the meaning of the economy of the world at large in so
far as it succeeds in explaining the economy of the individual.
The Ricardian theory only takes into account the quantities of
labor expended, and only in so far as these are concerned does it
trace the effects of the division of labor and of free
competition and show how the individual is situated in his
relation to the welfare of the whole. If this theory aims to show
that the greatest possible results may be attained by the least
possible effort, it certainly does not explain how to measure the
degree of this success. It is not sufficient to point to utility
alone as this measure, for utility as such is nowhere decisive in
the economic world. Since Ricardo has no measure for the results,
that is, for the economic gain, he is not able to explain the
nature of exchange.
Jevons and his school have in this respect progressed far
beyond the standpoint of Ricardo. Jevons estimated utility by the
standard of the marginal utility. He is able to correlate
expenditure and gain in production as well as sacrifice and its
reward in exchange. The economic balance-sheet is according to
his theory "a calculus of pain and pleasure," and the word
"calculus" has its definite sense in this connection because
Jevons actually understood how ingeniously to measure "pleasure."
But not even Jevons has, in our opinion, succeeded in giving
a satisfactory explanation of the nature of the economic balance
sheet. He has an insufficient measure for the economic
expenditure because he measured it according to "pain." The
principle of gaining the maximum of pleasure for the minimum of
pain may suffice well enough when men gain sensual pleasures by
means of physical exertions. If the utilitarians are right the
highest rule of moral conduct may even be deduced from this
principle. But it cannot without modification be applied in
political economy and especially in relation to production,
because the latter requires not only personal sacrifices, but
also the sacrifice of material objects. These, however, represent
the possessions of the producer, the sacrifice of which does not
necessarily imply any feeling of pain. Certainly, no new
principle is in this way introduced into political economy, since
we estimate the goods which constitute our wealth by no other
standard than their utility for us. But it remains for theory to
explain according to what laws we conned the idea of utility --
of pleasure -- with the goods which compose wealth. We estimate
them not only according to the minimum of pain, but we consider
them at the same time as a condition of pleasure, and it is
according to this pleasure that we estimate their value. The
musician whose painless performances delight his hearers, would
reckon but poorly if he should estimate his performances by his
pain and not by the delight of the public. The calculations of
political economy will only be satisfactorily explained when the
general and, for this reason, insignificant formula of "the
calculus of pleasure and pain" is applied to these complicated
conditions and the special rules are formulated which result from
such an application. "To gain the maximum of booty with the
minimum of effort" may be the simple sense of the economic
reckoning of a hunter who has nothing to save but his strength.
The economic reckoning in the age of capital is, however, harder
to explain. There is more behind the mysteries of commercial
bookkeeping than may be dreamt of in the philosophy of the
hunter, and a formula explaining the latter would be but ill
adapted for the interpretation of the former.
What I have said above in regard to the conception of cost
and the meaning of the cost-account shows how we attempt to carry
out the "calculus of pleasure" with regard to productive
property. However, I cannot enter into further details here, nor
can I develop the influence which, in our opinion, is to be
attributed to the effort expended by labor. Although we deny that
this enters as such into the value of the commodities, we do not,
of course, mean in any sense to banish it from the sphere of
economic speculation.
NOTES:
1. "Bohm-Bawerk on Value and Wages" Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Oct. 1890.
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