and was not infrequently styled [Greek: sophos]. Cicero here veils his
thorough conversance with Greek literature and philosophy, and assumes
the part of Laelius, in whose time, though Greek was not omitted in the
education of cultivated men, the study was comparatively new, and was
not carried to any great extent.]
Others, [Footnote: The Epicureans.] I am told, with even much less of
true human feeling, teach what I touched upon briefly a little while
ago, that friendships are to be sought for defence and help, not on
account of good-will and affection. The less of self-confidence and the
less of strength one has, the more is he inclined to make friends. Thus
it is that women [Footnote: Latin, _mulierculae_, a diminutive, meaning,
however, not _little women_, but denoting the feebleness and dependence
of women in comparison with men. It must be confessed, too, that the
term is sometimes used, and perhaps here, semi-contemptuously; for the
Roman man felt an overweening pride in mere manhood.] seek the support
of friendship more than men do, the poor more than the rich, the
unfortunate more than those who seem happy. Oh, pre-eminent wisdom! It
is like taking the sun out of the world, to bereave human life of
friendship, than which the immortal gods have given man nothing better,
nothing more gladdening. What is the ease of which they speak? It is
indeed pleasing in aspect, but on many occasions it is to be renounced;
for it is not fitting, in order to avoid solicitude, either to refuse to
undertake any right cause or act, or to drop it after it is undertaken.
If we flee from care, we must flee from virtue, which of necessity with
no little care spurns and abhors its opposites, as goodness spurns and
abhors wickedness; temperance, excess; courage, cowardice. Thus you may
see that honest men are excessively grieved by the dishonest, the brave
by the pusillanimous, those who lead sober lives by the dissolute. It is
indeed characteristic of a well-ordered mind to rejoice in what is good
and to be grieved by the opposite. If then, pain of mind fall to the lot
of a wise man as it must of necessity unless we imagine his mind
divested of its humanity, why should we take friendship wholly out of
life, lest we experience some little trouble on account of it? Yet more,
if emotion be eliminated, what difference is there, I say not between a
man and a brute, but between a man and a rock, or the trunk of a tree,
or any inanimate object? Nor are those to be listened to, who regard
virtue as something hard and iron-like. [Footnote: Here, undoubtedly,
Cicero refers to the sterner type of Stoicism, which in his time was
already obsolescent, and was yielding place to the milder, while no less
rigid, ethics of which the _De Officiis_ may be regarded as the manual.]
As in many other matters, so in friendship, it is tender and flexible so
that it expands, as it were, with a friend's well being, and shrinks
when his peace is disturbed. Therefore the pain which must often be
incurred on a friend's account is not of sufficient moment to banish
friendship from human life, any more than the occasional care and
trouble which the virtues bring should be a reason for renouncing them.
14. Since virtue attracts friendship, as I have said, if there shines
forth any manifestation of virtue with which a mind similarly disposed
can come into contact and union from such intercourse love must of
necessity spring. For what is so absurd as to be charmed with many
things that have no substantial worth, as with office, fame,
architecture, dress, and genteel appearance, but not to be in any wise
charmed by a mind endowed with virtue, and capable of either loving or--
if I may use the word--re-loving? [Footnote: Latin, _redamare_, a word
coined by Cicero, and used with the apology, _ut ita dicam_] Nothing
indeed yields a richer revenue than kind affections, nothing gives more
delight than the interchange of friendly cares and offices. Then if we