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A Theory of Human Motivation
A. H. Maslow (1943)
Classics in the History of Psychology
An internet resource developed by
Christopher D. Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario
ISSN 1492-3713
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A Theory of Human Motivation
A. H. Maslow (1943)
Originally Published in Psychological Review, 50, 370-396.
Posted August 2000
[p. 370] I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous paper (13) various propositions were presented which would have to be included
in any theory of human motivation that could lay claim to being definitive. These conclusions
may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. The integrated wholeness of the organism must be one of the foundation stones
of motivation theory.
2. The hunger drive (or any other physiological drive) was rejected as a centering
point or model for a definitive theory of motivation. Any drive that is somatically
based and localizable was shown to be atypical rather than typical in human
motivation.
3. Such a theory should stress and center itself upon ultimate or basic goals rather
than partial or superficial ones, upon ends rather than means to these ends. Such a
stress would imply a more central place for unconscious than for conscious
motivations.
4. There are usually available various cultural paths to the same goal. Therefore
conscious, specific, local-cultural desires are not as fundamental in motivation
theory as the more basic, unconscious goals.
5. Any motivated behavior, either preparatory or consummatory, must be
understood to be a channel through which many basic needs may be
simultaneously expressed or satisfied. Typically an act has more than one
motivation.
6. Practically all organismic states are to be understood as motivated and as
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motivating.
7. Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say,
the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more
pre-potent need. Man is a perpetually wanting animal. Also no need or drive can be
treated as if it were isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction of other drives.
8. Lists of drives will get us nowhere for various theoretical and practical reasons.
Furthermore any classification of motivations [p. 371] must deal with the problem of
levels of specificity or generalization the motives to be classified.
9. Classifications of motivations must be based upon goals rather than upon
instigating drives or motivated behavior.
10. Motivation theory should be human-centered rather than animal-centered.
11. The situation or the field in which the organism reacts must be taken into
account but the field alone can rarely serve as an exclusive explanation for
behavior. Furthermore the field itself must be interpreted in terms of the organism.
Field theory cannot be a substitute for motivation theory.
12. Not only the integration of the organism must be taken into account, but also the
possibility of isolated, specific, partial or segmental reactions. It has since become
necessary to add to these another affirmation.
13. Motivation theory is not synonymous with behavior theory. The motivations are
only one class of determinants of behavior. While behavior is almost always
motivated, it is also almost always biologically, culturally and situationally
determined as well.
The present paper is an attempt to formulate a positive theory of motivation which will satisfy
these theoretical demands and at the same time conform to the known facts, clinical and
observational as well as experimental. It derives most directly, however, from clinical
experience. This theory is, I think, in the functionalist tradition of James and Dewey, and is
fused with the holism of Wertheimer (19), Goldstein (6), and Gestalt Psychology, and with the
dynamicism of Freud (4) and Adler (1). This fusion or synthesis may arbitrarily be called a
'general-dynamic' theory.
It is far easier to perceive and to criticize the aspects in motivation theory than to remedy them.
Mostly this is because of the very serious lack of sound data in this area. I conceive this lack of
sound facts to be due primarily to the absence of a valid theory of motivation. The present
theory then must be considered to be a suggested program or framework for future research
and must stand or fall, not so much on facts available or evidence presented, as upon
researches to be done, researches suggested perhaps, by the questions raised in this paper.[p.
372]
II. THE BASIC NEEDS
The 'physiological' needs. -- The needs that are usually taken as the starting point for
motivation theory are the so-called physiological drives. Two recent lines of research make it
necessary to revise our customary notions about these needs, first, the development of the
concept of homeostasis, and second, the finding that appetites (preferential choices among
foods) are a fairly efficient indication of actual needs or lacks in the body.
Homeostasis refers to the body's automatic efforts to maintain a constant, normal state of the
blood stream. Cannon (2) has described this process for (1) the water content of the blood, (2)
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salt content, (3) sugar content, (4) protein content, (5) fat content, (6) calcium content, (7)
oxygen content, (8) constant hydrogen-ion level (acid-base balance) and (9) constant
temperature of the blood. Obviously this list can be extended to include other minerals, the
hormones, vitamins, etc.
Young in a recent article (21) has summarized the work on appetite in its relation to body
needs. If the body lacks some chemical, the individual will tend to develop a specific appetite or
partial hunger for that food element.
Thus it seems impossible as well as useless to make any list of fundamental physiological
needs for they can come to almost any number one might wish, depending on the degree of
specificity of description. We can not identify all physiological needs as homeostatic. That
sexual desire, sleepiness, sheer activity and maternal behavior in animals, are homeostatic,
has not yet been demonstrated. Furthermore, this list would not include the various sensory
pleasures (tastes, smells, tickling, stroking) which are probably physiological and which may
become the goals of motivated behavior.
In a previous paper (13) it has been pointed out that these physiological drives or needs are to
be considered unusual rather than typical because they are isolable, and because they are
localizable somatically. That is to say, they are relatively independent of each other, of other
motivations [p. 373] and of the organism as a whole, and secondly, in many cases, it is possible
to demonstrate a localized, underlying somatic base for the drive. This is true less generally
than has been thought (exceptions are fatigue, sleepiness, maternal responses) but it is still
true in the classic instances of hunger, sex, and thirst.
It should be pointed out again that any of the physiological needs and the consummatory
behavior involved with them serve as channels for all sorts of other needs as well. That is to
say, the person who thinks he is hungry may actually be seeking more for comfort, or
dependence, than for vitamins or proteins. Conversely, it is possible to satisfy the hunger need
in part by other activities such as drinking water or smoking cigarettes. In other words, relatively
isolable as these physiological needs are, they are not completely so.
Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most pre-potent of all needs. What this means
specifically is, that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it
is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others.
A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food
more strongly than for anything else.
If all the needs are unsatisfied, and the organism is then dominated by the physiological needs,
all other needs may become simply non-existent or be pushed into the background. It is then
fair to characterize the whole organism by saying simply that it is hungry, for consciousness is
almost completely preempted by hunger. All capacities are put into the service of hunger-
satisfaction, and the organization of these capacities is almost entirely determined by the one
purpose of satisfying hunger. The receptors and effectors, the intelligence, memory, habits, all
may now be defined simply as hunger-gratifying tools. Capacities that are not useful for this
purpose lie dormant, or are pushed into the background. The urge to write poetry, the desire to
acquire an automobile, the interest in American history, the desire for a new pair of shoes are,
in the extreme case, forgotten or become of sec-[p.374]ondary importance. For the man who is
extremely and dangerously hungry, no other interests exist but food. He dreams food, he
remembers food, he thinks about food, he emotes only about food, he perceives only food and
he wants only food. The more subtle determinants that ordinarily fuse with the physiological
drives in organizing even feeding, drinking or sexual behavior, may now be so completely
overwhelmed as to allow us to speak at this time (but only at this time) of pure hunger drive and
behavior, with the one unqualified aim of relief.
Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain need is
that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically and extremely
hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is plenty of food. He
tends to think that, if only he is guaranteed food for the rest of his life, he will be perfectly happy
and will never want anything more. Life itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything
else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy,
may all be waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach. Such
a man may fairly be said to live by bread alone.
It cannot possibly be denied that such things are true but their generality can be denied.
Emergency conditions are, almost by definition, rare in the normally functioning peaceful
society. That this truism can be forgotten is due mainly to two reasons. First, rats have few
motivations other than physiological ones, and since so much of the research upon motivation
has been made with these animals, it is easy to carry the rat-picture over to the human being.
Secondly, it is too often not realized that culture itself is an adaptive tool, one of whose main
functions is to make the physiological emergencies come less and less often. In most of the
known societies, chronic extreme hunger of the emergency type is rare, rather than common. In
any case, this is still true in the United States. The average American citizen is experiencing
appetite rather than hunger when he says "I am [p. 375] hungry." He is apt to experience sheer
life-and-death hunger only by accident and then only a few times through his entire life.
Obviously a good way to obscure the 'higher' motivations, and to get a lopsided view of human
capacities and human nature, is to make the organism extremely and chronically hungry or
thirsty. Anyone who attempts to make an emergency picture into a typical one, and who will
measure all of man's goals and desires by his behavior during extreme physiological
deprivation is certainly being blind to many things. It is quite true that man lives by bread alone
-- when there is no bread. But what happens to man's desires when there is plenty of bread and
when his belly is chronically filled?
At once other (and 'higher') needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers,
dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still 'higher')
needs emerge and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are
organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency.
One main implication of this phrasing is that gratification becomes as important a concept as
deprivation in motivation theory, for it releases the organism from the domination of a relatively
more physiological need, permitting thereby the emergence of other more social goals. The
physiological needs, along with their partial goals, when chronically gratified cease to exist as
active determinants or organizers of behavior. They now exist only in a potential fashion in the
sense that they may emerge again to dominate the organism if they are thwarted. But a want
that is satisfied is no longer a want. The organism is dominated and its behavior organized only
by unsatisfied needs. If hunger is satisfied, it becomes unimportant in the current dynamics of
the individual.
This statement is somewhat qualified by a hypothesis to be discussed more fully later, namely
that it is precisely those individuals in whom a certain need has always been satisfied who are
best equipped to tolerate deprivation of that need in the future, and that furthermore, those who
have been de-[p. 376]prived in the past will react differently to current satisfactions than the one
who has never been deprived.
The safety needs. -- If the physiological needs are relatively well gratified, there then emerges a
new set of needs, which we may categorize roughly as the safety needs. All that has been said
of the physiological needs is equally true, although in lesser degree, of these desires. The
organism may equally well be wholly dominated by them. They may serve as the almost
exclusive organizers of behavior, recruiting all the capacities of the organism in their service,
and we may then fairly describe the whole organism as a safety-seeking mechanism. Again we
may say of the receptors, the effectors, of the intellect and the other capacities that they are
primarily safety-seeking tools. Again, as in the hungry man, we find that the dominating goal is
a strong determinant not only of his current world-outlook and philosophy but also of his
philosophy of the future. Practically everything looks less important than safety, (even
sometimes the physiological needs which being satisfied, are now underestimated). A man, in
this state, if it is extreme enough and chronic enough, may be characterized as living almost for
safety alone.
Although in this paper we are interested primarily in the needs of the adult, we can approach an
understanding of his safety needs perhaps more efficiently by observation of infants and
children, in whom these needs are much more simple and obvious. One reason for the clearer
appearance of the threat or danger reaction in infants, is that they do not inhibit this reaction at
all, whereas adults in our society have been taught to inhibit it at all costs. Thus even when
adults do feel their safety to be threatened we may not be able to see this on the surface.
Infants will react in a total fashion and as if they were endangered, if they are disturbed or
dropped suddenly, startled by loud noises, flashing light, or other unusual sensory stimulation,
by rough handling, by general loss of support in the mother's arms, or by inadequate support.
[1][p. 377]
In infants we can also see a much more direct reaction to bodily illnesses of various kinds.
Sometimes these illnesses seem to be immediately and per se threatening and seem to make
the child feel unsafe. For instance, vomiting, colic or other sharp pains seem to make the child
look at the whole world in a different way. At such a moment of pain, it may be postulated that,
for the child, the appearance of the whole world suddenly changes from sunniness to darkness,
so to speak, and becomes a place in which anything at all might happen, in which previously
stable things have suddenly become unstable. Thus a child who because of some bad food is
taken ill may, for a day or two, develop fear, nightmares, and a need for protection and
reassurance never seen in him before his illness.
Another indication of the child's need for safety is his preference for some kind of undisrupted
routine or rhythm. He seems to want a predictable, orderly world. For instance, injustice,
unfairness, or inconsistency in the parents seems to make a child feel anxious and unsafe. This
attitude may be not so much because of the injustice per se or any particular pains involved,
but rather because this treatment threatens to make the world look unreliable, or unsafe, or
unpredictable. Young children seem to thrive better under a system which has at least a
skeletal outline of rigidity, In which there is a schedule of a kind, some sort of routine,
something that can be counted upon, not only for the present but also far into the future.
Perhaps one could express this more accurately by saying that the child needs an organized
world rather than an unorganized or unstructured one.
The central role of the parents and the normal family setup are indisputable. Quarreling,
physical assault, separation, divorce or death within the family may be particularly terrifying.
Also parental outbursts of rage or threats of punishment directed to the child, calling him
names, speaking to him harshly, shaking him, handling him roughly, or actual [p. 378] physical
punishment sometimes elicit such total panic and terror in the child that we must assume more
is involved than the physical pain alone. While it is true that in some children this terror may
represent also a fear of loss of parental love, it can also occur in completely rejected children,
who seem to cling to the hating parents more for sheer safety and protection than because of
hope of love.
Confronting the average child with new, unfamiliar, strange, unmanageable stimuli or situations
will too frequently elicit the danger or terror reaction, as for example, getting lost or even being
separated from the parents for a short time, being confronted with new faces, new situations or
new tasks, the sight of strange, unfamiliar or uncontrollable objects, illness or death.
Particularly at such times, the child's frantic clinging to his parents is eloquent testimony to their
role as protectors (quite apart from their roles as food-givers and love-givers).
From these and similar observations, we may generalize and say that the average child in our
society generally prefers a safe, orderly, predictable, organized world, which he can count, on,
and in which unexpected, unmanageable or other dangerous things do not happen, and in
which, in any case, he has all-powerful parents who protect and shield him from harm.
That these reactions may so easily be observed in children is in a way a proof of the fact that
children in our society, feel too unsafe (or, in a word, are badly brought up). Children who are
reared in an unthreatening, loving family do not ordinarily react as we have described above
(17). In such children the danger reactions are apt to come mostly to objects or situations that
adults too would consider dangerous.[2]
The healthy, normal, fortunate adult in our culture is largely satisfied in his safety needs. The
peaceful, smoothly [p. 379] running, 'good' society ordinarily makes its members feel safe
enough from wild animals, extremes of temperature, criminals, assault and murder, tyranny,
etc. Therefore, in a very real sense, he no longer has any safety needs as active motivators.
Just as a sated man no longer feels hungry, a safe man no longer feels endangered. If we wish
to see these needs directly and clearly we must turn to neurotic or near-neurotic individuals,
and to the economic and social underdogs. In between these extremes, we can perceive the
expressions of safety needs only in such phenomena as, for instance, the common preference
for a job with tenure and protection, the desire for a savings account, and for insurance of
various kinds (medical, dental, unemployment, disability, old age).
Other broader aspects of the attempt to seek safety and stability in the world are seen in the
very common preference for familiar rather than unfamiliar things, or for the known rather than
the unknown. The tendency to have some religion or world-philosophy that organizes the
universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in
part motivated by safety-seeking. Here too we may list science and philosophy in general as
partially motivated by the safety needs (we shall see later that there are also other motivations
to scientific, philosophical or religious endeavor).
Otherwise the need for safety is seen as an active and dominant mobilizer of the organism's
resources only in emergencies, e. g., war, disease, natural catastrophes, crime waves, societal
disorganization, neurosis, brain injury, chronically bad situation.
Some neurotic adults in our society are, in many ways, like the unsafe child in their desire for
safety, although in the former it takes on a somewhat special appearance. Their reaction is
often to unknown, psychological dangers in a world that is perceived to be hostile,
overwhelming and threatening. Such a person behaves as if a great catastrophe were almost
always impending, i.e., he is usually responding as if to an emergency. His safety needs often
find specific [p. 380] expression in a search for a protector, or a stronger person on whom he
may depend, or perhaps, a Fuehrer.
The neurotic individual may be described in a slightly different way with some usefulness as a
grown-up person who retains his childish attitudes toward the world. That is to say, a neurotic
adult may be said to behave 'as if' he were actually afraid of a spanking, or of his mother's
disapproval, or of being abandoned by his parents, or having his food taken away from him. It is
as if his childish attitudes of fear and threat reaction to a dangerous world had gone
underground, and untouched by the growing up and learning processes, were now ready to be
called out by any stimulus that would make a child feel endangered and threatened.[3]
The neurosis in which the search for safety takes its dearest form is in the compulsive-
obsessive neurosis. Compulsive-obsessives try frantically to order and stabilize the world so
that no unmanageable, unexpected or unfamiliar dangers will ever appear (14); They hedge
themselves about with all sorts of ceremonials, rules and formulas so that every possible
contingency may be provided for and so that no new contingencies may appear. They are
much like the brain injured cases, described by Goldstein (6), who manage to maintain their
equilibrium by avoiding everything unfamiliar and strange and by ordering their restricted world
in such a neat, disciplined, orderly fashion that everything in the world can be counted upon.
They try to arrange the world so that anything unexpected (dangers) cannot possibly occur. If,
through no fault of their own, something unexpected does occur, they go into a panic reaction
as if this unexpected occurrence constituted a grave danger. What we can see only as a none-
too-strong preference in the healthy person, e. g., preference for the familiar, becomes a life-
and-death. necessity in abnormal cases.
The love needs. -- If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified, then
there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs, and the whole cycle [p. 381]
already described will repeat itself with this new center. Now the person will feel keenly, as
never before, the absence of friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children. He will hunger for
affectionate relations with people in general, namely, for a place in his group, and he will strive
with great intensity to achieve this goal. He will want to attain such a place more than anything
else in the world and may even forget that once, when he was hungry, he sneered at love.
In our society the thwarting of these needs is the most commonly found core in cases of
maladjustment and more severe psychopathology. Love and affection, as well as their possible
expression in sexuality, are generally looked upon with ambivalence and are customarily
hedged about with many restrictions and inhibitions. Practically all theorists of psychopathology
have stressed thwarting of the love needs as basic in the picture of maladjustment. Many
clinical studies have therefore been made of this need and we know more about it perhaps than
any of the other needs except the physiological ones (14).
One thing that must be stressed at this point is that love is not synonymous with sex. Sex may
be studied as a purely physiological need. Ordinarily sexual behavior is multi-determined, that
is to say, determined not only by sexual but also by other needs, chief among which are the
love and affection needs. Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the love needs involve both
giving and receiving love.[4]
The esteem needs. -- All people in our society (with a few pathological exceptions) have a need
or desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or
self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. By firmly based self-esteem, we mean that which is
soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others. These needs may be
classified into two subsidiary sets. These are, first, the desire for strength, for achievement, for
adequacy, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom.[5]
Secondly, we have what [p. 382] we may call the desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as
respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation.[6]
These needs have been relatively stressed by Alfred Adler and his followers, and have been
relatively neglected by Freud and the psychoanalysts. More and more today however there is
appearing widespread appreciation of their central importance.
Satisfaction of the self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength,
capability and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world. But thwarting of these
needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness and of helplessness. These feelings in turn
give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends. An
appreciation of the necessity of basic self-confidence and an understanding of how helpless
people are without it, can be easily gained from a study of severe traumatic neurosis (8).[7]
The need for self-actualization. -- Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may still often (if not
always) expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual
is doing what he is fitted for. A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must
write, if he is to be ultimately happy. What a man can be, he must be. This need we may call
self-actualization.
This term, first coined by Kurt Goldstein, is being used in this paper in a much more specific
and limited fashion. It refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to
become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to
become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.[p.
383]
The specific form that these needs will take will of course vary greatly from person to person. In
one individual it may take the form of the desire to be an ideal mother, in another it may be
expressed athletically, and in still another it may be expressed in painting pictures or in
inventions. It is not necessarily a creative urge although in people who have any capacities for
creation it will take this form.
The clear emergence of these needs rests upon prior satisfaction of the physiological, safety,
love and esteem needs. We shall call people who are satisfied in these needs, basically
satisfied people, and it is from these that we may expect the fullest (and healthiest)
creativeness.[8] Since, in our society, basically satisfied people are the exception, we do not
know much about self-actualization, either experimentally or clinically. It remains a challenging
problem for research.
The preconditions for the basic need satisfactions. -- There are certain conditions which are
immediate prerequisites for the basic need satisfactions. Danger to these is reacted to almost
as if it were a direct danger to the basic needs themselves. Such conditions as freedom to
speak, freedom to do what one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to
express one's self, freedom to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend one's
self, justice, fairness, honesty, orderliness in the group are examples of such preconditions for
basic need satisfactions. Thwarting in these freedoms will be reacted to with a threat or
emergency response. These conditions are not ends in themselves but they are almost so
since they are so closely related to the basic needs, which are apparently the only ends in
themselves. These conditions are defended because without them the basic satisfactions are
quite impossible, or at least, very severely endangered.[p. 384]
If we remember that the cognitive capacities (perceptual, intellectual, learning) are a set of
adjustive tools, which have, among other functions, that of satisfaction of our basic needs, then
it is clear that any danger to them, any deprivation or blocking of their free use, must also be
indirectly threatening to the basic needs themselves. Such a statement is a partial solution of
the general problems of curiosity, the search for knowledge, truth and wisdom, and the ever-
persistent urge to solve the cosmic mysteries.
We must therefore introduce another hypothesis and speak of degrees of closeness to the
basic needs, for we have already pointed out that any conscious desires (partial goals) are
more or less important as they are more or less close to the basic needs. The same statement
may be made for various behavior acts. An act is psychologically important if it contributes
directly to satisfaction of basic needs. The less directly it so contributes, or the weaker this
contribution is, the less important this act must be conceived to be from the point of view of
dynamic psychology. A similar statement may be made for the various defense or coping
mechanisms. Some are very directly related to the protection or attainment of the basic needs,
others are only weakly and distantly related. Indeed if we wished, we could speak of more basic
and less basic defense mechanisms, and then affirm that danger to the more basic defenses is
more threatening than danger to less basic defenses (always remembering that this is so only
because of their relationship to the basic needs).
The desires to know and to understand. -- So far, we have mentioned the cognitive needs only
in passing. Acquiring knowledge and systematizing the universe have been considered as, in
part, techniques for the achievement of basic safety in the world, or, for the intelligent man,
expressions of self-actualization. Also freedom of inquiry and expression have been discussed
as preconditions of satisfactions of the basic needs. True though these formulations may be,
they do not constitute definitive answers to the question as to the motivation role of curiosity,
learning, philosophizing, experimenting, etc. They are, at best, no more than partial answers.[p.
385]
This question is especially difficult because we know so little about the facts. Curiosity,
exploration, desire for the facts, desire to know may certainly be observed easily enough. The
fact that they often are pursued even at great cost to the individual's safety is an earnest of the
partial character of our previous discussion. In addition, the writer must admit that, though he
has sufficient clinical evidence to postulate the desire to know as a very strong drive in
intelligent people, no data are available for unintelligent people. It may then be largely a
function of relatively high intelligence. Rather tentatively, then, and largely in the hope of
stimulating discussion and research, we shall postulate a basic desire to know, to be aware of
reality, to get the facts, to satisfy curiosity, or as Wertheimer phrases it, to see rather than to be
blind.
This postulation, however, is not enough. Even after we know, we are impelled to know more
and more minutely and microscopically on the one hand, and on the other, more and more
extensively in the direction of a world philosophy, religion, etc. The facts that we acquire, if they
are isolated or atomistic, inevitably get theorized about, and either analyzed or organized or
both. This process has been phrased by some as the search for 'meaning.' We shall then
postulate a desire to understand, to systematize, to organize, to analyze, to look for relations
and meanings.
Once these desires are accepted for discussion, we see that they too form themselves into a
small hierarchy in which the desire to know is prepotent over the desire to understand. All the
characteristics of a hierarchy of prepotency that we have described above, seem to hold for this
one as well.
We must guard ourselves against the too easy tendency to separate these desires from the
basic needs we have discussed above, i.e., to make a sharp dichotomy between 'cognitive' and
'conative' needs. The desire to know and to understand are themselves conative, i.e., have a
striving character, and are as much personality needs as the 'basic needs' we have already
discussed (19).[p. 386]
III. FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASIC NEEDS
The degree of fixity of the hierarchy of basic needs. -- We have spoken so far as if this
hierarchy were a fixed order but actually it is not nearly as rigid as we may have implied. It is
true that most of the people with whom we have worked have seemed to have these basic
needs in about the order that has been indicated. However, there have been a number of
exceptions.
(1) There are some people in whom, for instance, self-esteem seems to be more important than
love. This most common reversal in the hierarchy is usually due to the development of the
notion that the person who is most likely to be loved is a strong or powerful person, one who
inspires respect or fear, and who is self confident or aggressive. Therefore such people who
lack love and seek it, may try hard to put on a front of aggressive, confident behavior. But
essentially they seek high self-esteem and its behavior expressions more as a means-to-an-
end than for its own sake; they seek self-assertion for the sake of love rather than for self-
esteem itself.
(2) There are other, apparently innately creative people in whom the drive to creativeness
seems to be more important than any other counter-determinant. Their creativeness might
appear not as self-actualization released by basic satisfaction, but in spite of lack of basic
satisfaction.
(3) In certain people the level of aspiration may be permanently deadened or lowered. That is
to say, the less pre-potent goals may simply be lost, and may disappear forever, so that the
person who has experienced life at a very low level, i. e., chronic unemployment, may continue
to be satisfied for the rest of his life if only he can get enough food.
(4) The so-called 'psychopathic personality' is another example of permanent loss of the love
needs. These are people who, according to the best data available (9), have been starved for
love in the earliest months of their lives and have simply lost forever the desire and the ability to
give and to receive affection (as animals lose sucking or pecking reflexes that are not exercised
soon enough after birth).[p. 387]
(5) Another cause of reversal of the hierarchy is that when a need has been satisfied for a long
time, this need may be underevaluated. People who have never experienced chronic hunger
are apt to underestimate its effects and to look upon food as a rather unimportant thing. If they
are dominated by a higher need, this higher need will seem to be the most important of all. It
then becomes possible, and indeed does actually happen, that they may, for the sake of this
higher need, put themselves into the position of being deprived in a more basic need. We may
expect that after a long-time deprivation of the more basic need there will be a tendency to
reevaluate both needs so that the more pre-potent need will actually become consciously
prepotent for the individual who may have given it up very lightly. Thus, a man who has given
up his job rather than lose his self-respect, and who then starves for six months or so, may be
willing to take his job back even at the price of losing his a self-respect.
(6) Another partial explanation of apparent reversals is seen in the fact that we have been
talking about the hierarchy of prepotency in terms of consciously felt wants or desires rather
than of behavior. Looking at behavior itself may give us the wrong impression. What we have
claimed is that the person will want the more basic of two needs when deprived in both. There
is no necessary implication here that he will act upon his desires. Let us say again that there
are many determinants of behavior other than the needs and desires.
(7) Perhaps more important than all these exceptions are the ones that involve ideals, high
social standards, high values and the like. With such values people become martyrs; they give
up everything for the sake of a particular ideal, or value. These people may be understood, at
least in part, by reference to one basic concept (or hypothesis) which may be called 'increased
frustration-tolerance through early gratification'. People who have been satisfied in their basic
needs throughout their lives, particularly in their earlier years, seem to develop exceptional
power to withstand present or future thwarting of these needs simply because they have strong,
[p. 388] healthy character structure as a result of basic satisfaction. They are the 'strong' people
who can easily weather disagreement or opposition, who can swim against the stream of public
opinion and who can stand up for the truth at great personal cost. It is just the ones who have
loved and been well loved, and who have had many deep friendships who can hold out against
hatred, rejection or persecution.
I say all this in spite of the fact that there is a certain amount of sheer habituation which is also
involved in any full discussion of frustration tolerance. For instance, it is likely that those
persons who have been accustomed to relative starvation for a long time, are partially enabled
thereby to withstand food deprivation. What sort of balance must be made between these two
tendencies, of habituation on the one hand, and of past satisfaction breeding present frustration
tolerance on the other hand, remains to be worked out by further research. Meanwhile we may
assume that they are both operative, side by side, since they do not contradict each other, In
respect to this phenomenon of increased frustration tolerance, it seems probable that the most
important gratifications come in the first two years of life. That is to say, people who have been
made secure and strong in the earliest years, tend to remain secure and strong thereafter in the
face of whatever threatens.
Degree of relative satisfaction. -- So far, our theoretical discussion may have given the
impression that these five sets of needs are somehow in a step-wise, all-or-none relationships
to each other. We have spoken in such terms as the following: "If one need is satisfied, then
another emerges." This statement might give the false impression that a need must be satisfied
100 per cent before the next need emerges. In actual fact, most members of our society who
are normal, are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their
basic needs at the same time. A more realistic description of the hierarchy would be in terms of
decreasing percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of prepotency, For instance, if
I may assign arbitrary figures for the sake of illustration, it is as if the average citizen [p. 389] is
satisfied perhaps 85 per cent in his physiological needs, 70 per cent in his safety needs, 50 per
cent in his love needs, 40 per cent in his self-esteem needs, and 10 per cent in his self-
actualization needs.
As for the concept of emergence of a new need after satisfaction of the prepotent need, this
emergence is not a sudden, saltatory phenomenon but rather a gradual emergence by slow
degrees from nothingness. For instance, if prepotent need A is satisfied only 10 per cent: then
need B may not be visible at all. However, as this need A becomes satisfied 25 per cent, need
B may emerge 5 per cent, as need A becomes satisfied 75 per cent need B may emerge go per
cent, and so on.
Unconscious character of needs. -- These needs are neither necessarily conscious nor
unconscious. On the whole, however, in the average person, they are more often unconscious
rather than conscious. It is not necessary at this point to overhaul the tremendous mass of
evidence which indicates the crucial importance of unconscious motivation. It would by now be
expected, on a priori grounds alone, that unconscious motivations would on the whole be rather
more important than the conscious motivations. What we have called the basic needs are very
often largely unconscious although they may, with suitable techniques, and with sophisticated
people become conscious.
Cultural specificity and generality of needs. -- This classification of basic needs makes some
attempt to take account of the relative unity behind the superficial differences in specific desires
from one culture to another. Certainly in any particular culture an individual's conscious
motivational content will usually be extremely different from the conscious motivational content
of an individual in another society. However, it is the common experience of anthropologists
that people, even in different societies, are much more alike than we would think from our first
contact with them, and that as we know them better we seem to find more and more of this
commonness, We then recognize the most startling differences to be superficial rather than
basic, e. g., differences in style of hair-dress, clothes, tastes in food, etc. Our classification of
basic [p. 390] needs is in part an attempt to account for this unity behind the apparent diversity
from culture to culture. No claim is made that it is ultimate or universal for all cultures. The
claim is made only that it is relatively more ultimate, more universal, more basic, than the
superficial conscious desires from culture to culture, and makes a somewhat closer approach
to common-human characteristics, Basic needs are more common-human than superficial
desires or behaviors.
Multiple motivations of behavior. -- These needs must be understood not to be exclusive or
single determiners of certain kinds of behavior. An example may be found in any behavior that
seems to be physiologically motivated, such as eating, or sexual play or the like. The clinical
psychologists have long since found that any behavior may be a channel through which flow
various determinants. Or to say it in another way, most behavior is multi-motivated. Within the
sphere of motivational determinants any behavior tends to be determined by several or all of
the basic needs simultaneously rather than by only one of them. The latter would be more an
exception than the former. Eating may be partially for the sake of filling the stomach, and
partially for the sake of comfort and amelioration of other needs. One may make love not only
for pure sexual release, but also to convince one's self of one's masculinity, or to make a
conquest, to feel powerful, or to win more basic affection. As an illustration, I may point out that
it would be possible (theoretically if not practically) to analyze a single act of an individual and
see in it the expression of his physiological needs, his safety needs, his love needs, his esteem
needs and self-actualization. This contrasts sharply with the more naive brand of trait
psychology in which one trait or one motive accounts for a certain kind of act, i. e., an
aggressive act is traced solely to a trait of aggressiveness.
Multiple determinants of behavior. -- Not all behavior is determined by the basic needs. We
might even say that not all behavior is motivated. There are many determinants of behavior
other than motives.[9] For instance, one other im-[p. 391]portant class of determinants is the
so-called 'field' determinants. Theoretically, at least, behavior may be determined completely by
the field, or even by specific isolated external stimuli, as in association of ideas, or certain
conditioned reflexes. If in response to the stimulus word 'table' I immediately perceive a
memory image of a table, this response certainly has nothing to do with my basic needs.
Secondly, we may call attention again to the concept of 'degree of closeness to the basic
needs' or 'degree of motivation.' Some behavior is highly motivated, other behavior is only
weakly motivated. Some is not motivated at all (but all behavior is determined).
Another important point [10] is that there is a basic difference between expressive behavior and
coping behavior (functional striving, purposive goal seeking). An expressive behavior does not
try to do anything; it is simply a reflection of the personality. A stupid man behaves stupidly, not
because he wants to, or tries to, or is motivated to, but simply because he is what he is. The
same is true when I speak in a bass voice rather than tenor or soprano. The random
movements of a healthy child, the smile on the face of a happy man even when he is alone, the
springiness of the healthy man's walk, and the erectness of his carriage are other examples of
expressive, non-functional behavior. Also the style in which a man carries out almost all his
behavior, motivated as well as unmotivated, is often expressive.
We may then ask, is all behavior expressive or reflective of the character structure? The
answer is 'No.' Rote, habitual, automatized, or conventional behavior may or may not be
expressive. The same is true for most 'stimulus-bound' behaviors. It is finally necessary to
stress that expressiveness of behavior, and goal-directedness of behavior are not mutually
exclusive categories. Average behavior is usually both.
Goals as centering principle in motivation theory. -- It will be observed that the basic principle in
our classification has [p. 392] been neither the instigation nor the motivated behavior but rather
the functions, effects, purposes, or goals of the behavior. It has been proven sufficiently by
various people that this is the most suitable point for centering in any motivation theory.[11]
Animal- and human-centering. -- This theory starts with the human being rather than any lower
and presumably 'simpler' animal. Too many of the findings that have been made in animals
have been proven to be true for animals but not for the human being. There is no reason
whatsoever why we should start with animals in order to study human motivation. The logic or
rather illogic behind this general fallacy of 'pseudo-simplicity' has been exposed often enough
by philosophers and logicians as well as by scientists in each of the various fields. It is no more
necessary to study animals before one can study man than it is to study mathematics before
one can study geology or psychology or biology.
We may also reject the old, naive, behaviorism which assumed that it was somehow necessary,
or at least more 'scientific' to judge human beings by animal standards. One consequence of
this belief was that the whole notion of purpose and goal was excluded from motivational
psychology simply because one could not ask a white rat about his purposes. Tolman (18) has
long since proven in animal studies themselves that this exclusion was not necessary.
Motivation and the theory of psychopathogenesis. -- The conscious motivational content of
everyday life has, according to the foregoing, been conceived to be relatively important or
unimportant accordingly as it is more or less closely related to the basic goals. A desire for an
ice cream cone might actually be an indirect expression of a desire for love. If it is, then this
desire for the ice cream cone becomes extremely important motivation. If however the ice
cream is simply something to cool the mouth with, or a casual appetitive reaction, then the
desire is relatively unimportant. Everyday conscious desires are to be regarded as symptoms,
as [p. 393] surface indicators of more basic needs. If we were to take these superficial desires
at their face value me would find ourselves in a state of complete confusion which could never
be resolved, since we would be dealing seriously with symptoms rather than with what lay
behind the symptoms.
Thwarting of unimportant desires produces no psychopathological results; thwarting of a
basically important need does produce such results. Any theory of psychopathogenesis must
then be based on a sound theory of motivation. A conflict or a frustration is not necessarily
pathogenic. It becomes so only when it threatens or thwarts the basic needs, or partial needs
that are closely related to the basic needs (10).
The role of gratified needs. -- It has been pointed out above several times that our needs
usually emerge only when more prepotent needs have been gratified. Thus gratification has an
important role in motivation theory. Apart from this, however, needs cease to play an active
determining or organizing role as soon as they are gratified.
What this means is that, e. g., a basically satisfied person no longer has the needs for esteem,
love, safety, etc. The only sense in which he might be said to have them is in the almost
metaphysical sense that a sated man has hunger, or a filled bottle has emptiness. If we are
interested in what actually motivates us, and not in what has, will, or might motivate us, then a
satisfied need is not a motivator. It must be considered for all practical purposes simply not to
exist, to have disappeared. This point should be emphasized because it has been either
overlooked or contradicted in every theory of motivation I know.[12] The perfectly healthy,
normal, fortunate man has no sex needs or hunger needs, or needs for safety, or for love, or for
prestige, or self-esteem, except in stray moments of quickly passing threat. If we were to say
otherwise, we should also have to aver that every man had all the pathological reflexes, e. g.,
Babinski, etc., because if his nervous system were damaged, these would appear.
It is such considerations as these that suggest the bold [p. 394] postulation that a man who is
thwarted in any of his basic needs may fairly be envisaged simply as a sick man. This is a fair
parallel to our designation as 'sick' of the man who lacks vitamins or minerals. Who is to say
that a lack of love is less important than a lack of vitamins? Since we know the pathogenic
effects of love starvation, who is to say that we are invoking value-questions in an unscientific
or illegitimate way, any more than the physician does who diagnoses and treats pellagra or
scurvy? If I were permitted this usage, I should then say simply that a healthy man is primarily
motivated by his needs to develop and actualize his fullest potentialities and capacities. If a
man has any other basic needs in any active, chronic sense, then he is simply an unhealthy
man. He is as surely sick as if he had suddenly developed a strong salt-hunger or calcium
hunger.[13]
If this statement seems unusual or paradoxical the reader may be assured that this is only one
among many such paradoxes that will appear as we revise our ways of looking at man's deeper
motivations. When we ask what man wants of life, we deal with his very essence.
IV. SUMMARY
(1) There are at least five sets of goals, which we may call basic needs. These are briefly
physiological, safety, love, 'esteem, and self-actualization. In addition, we are motivated by the
desire to achieve or maintain the various conditions upon which these basic satisfactions rest
and by certain more intellectual desires.
(2) These basic goals are related to each other, being arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency.
This means that the most prepotent goal will monopolize consciousness and will tend of itself to
organize the recruitment of the various capacities of the organism. The less prepotent needs
are [p. 395] minimized, even forgotten or denied. But when a need is fairly well satisfied, the
next prepotent ('higher') need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve as
the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs are not active motivators.
Thus man is a perpetually wanting animal. Ordinarily the satisfaction of these wants is not
altogether mutually exclusive, but only tends to be. The average member of our society is most
often partially satisfied and partially unsatisfied in all of his wants. The hierarchy principle is
usually empirically observed in terms of increasing percentages of non-satisfaction as we go up
the hierarchy. Reversals of the average order of the hierarchy are sometimes observed. Also it
has been observed that an individual may permanently lose the higher wants in the hierarchy
under special conditions. There are not only ordinarily multiple motivations for usual behavior,
but in addition many determinants other than motives.
(3) Any thwarting or possibility of thwarting of these basic human goals, or danger to the
defenses which protect them, or to the conditions upon which they rest, is considered to be a
psychological threat. With a few exceptions, all psychopathology may be partially traced to
such threats. A basically thwarted man may actually be defined as a 'sick' man, if we wish.
(4) It is such basic threats which bring about the general emergency reactions.
(5) Certain other basic problems have not been dealt with because of limitations of space.
Among these are (a) the problem of values in any definitive motivation theory, (b) the relation
between appetites, desires, needs and what is 'good' for the organism, (c) the etiology of the
basic needs and their possible derivation in early childhood, (d) redefinition of motivational
concepts, i. e., drive, desire, wish, need, goal, (e) implication of our theory for hedonistic theory,
(f) the nature of the uncompleted act, of success and failure, and of aspiration-level, (g) the role
of association, habit and conditioning, (h) relation to the [p. 396] theory of inter-personal
relations, (i) implications for psychotherapy, (j) implication for theory of society, (k) the theory of
selfishness, (l) the relation between needs and cultural patterns, (m) the relation between this
theory and Alport's theory of functional autonomy. These as well as certain other less important
questions must be considered as motivation theory attempts to become definitive.
Notes
[1] As the child grows up, sheer knowledge and familiarity as well as better motor development
make these 'dangers' less and less dangerous and more and more manageable. Throughout
life it may be said that one of the main conative functions of education is this neutralizing of
apparent dangers through knowledge, e. g., I am not afraid of thunder because I know
something about it.
[2] A 'test battery' for safety might be confronting the child with a small exploding firecracker, or
with a bewhiskered face; having the mother leave the room, putting him upon a high ladder, a
hypodermic injection, having a mouse crawl up to him, etc. Of course I cannot seriously
recommend the deliberate use of such 'tests' for they might very well harm the child being
tested. But these and similar situations come up by the score in the child's ordinary day-to-day
living and may be observed. There is no reason why those stimuli should not be used with, far
example, young chimpanzees.
[3] Not all neurotic individuals feel unsafe. Neurosis may have at its core a thwarting of the
affection and esteem needs in a person who is generally safe.
[4] For further details see (12) and (16, Chap. 5).
[5] Whether or not this particular desire is universal we do not know. The crucial question,
especially important today, is "Will men who are enslaved and dominated inevitably feel
dissatisfied and rebellious?" We may assume on the basis of commonly known clinical data
that a man who has known true freedom (not paid for by giving up safety and security but rather
built on the basis of adequate safety and security) will not willingly or easily allow his freedom to
be taken away from him. But we do not know that this is true for the person born into slavery.
The events of the next decade should give us our answer. See discussion of this problem in
(5).
[6] Perhaps the desire for prestige and respect from others is subsidiary to the desire for self-
esteem or confidence in oneself. Observation of children seems to indicate that this is so, but
clinical data give no clear support for such a conclusion.
[7] For more extensive discussion of normal self-esteem, as well as for reports of various
researches, see (11).
[8] Clearly creative behavior, like painting, is like any other behavior in having multiple,
determinants. It may be seen in 'innately creative' people whether they are satisfied or not,
happy or unhappy, hungry or sated. Also it is clear that creative activity may be compensatory,
ameliorative or purely economic. It is my impression (as yet unconfirmed) that it is possible to
distinguish the artistic and intellectual products of basically satisfied people from those of
basically unsatisfied people by inspection alone. In any case, here too we must distinguish, in a
dynamic fashion, the overt behavior itself from its various motivations or purposes.
[9] I am aware that many psychologists md psychoanalysts use the term 'motivated' and
'determined' synonymously, e. g., Freud. But I consider this an obfuscating usage. Sharp
distinctions are necessary for clarity of thought, and precision in experimentation.
[10] To be discussed fully in a subsequent publication.
[11] The interested reader is referred to the very excellent discussion of this point in Murray's
Explorations in Personality (15).
[12] Note that acceptance of this theory necessitates basic revision of the Freudian theory.
[13] If we were to use the word 'sick' in this way, we should then also have to face squarely the
relations of man to his society. One clear implication of our definition would be that (1) since a
man is to be called sick who is basically thwarted, and (2) since such basic thwarting is made
possible ultimately only by forces outside the individual, then (3) sickness in the individual must
come ultimately from sickness in the society. The 'good' or healthy society would then be
defined as one that permitted man's highest purposes to emerge by satisfying all his prepotent
basic needs.
References
1. ADLER, A. Social interest. London: Faber & Faber, 1938.
2. CANNON, W. B. Wisdom of the body. New York: Norton, 1932.
3. FREUD, A. The ego and the mechanisms of defense. London: Hogarth, 1937.
4. FREUD, S. New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. New York: Norton, 1933.
5. FROMM, E. Escape from freedom. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941.
6. GOLDSTEIN, K. The organism. New York: American Book Co., 1939.
7. HORNEY, K. The neurotic personality of our time. New York: Norton, 1937.
8. KARDINER, A. The traumatic neuroses of war. New York: Hoeber, 1941.
9. LEVY, D. M. Primary affect hunger. Amer. J. Psychiat., 1937, 94, 643-652.
10. MASLOW, A. H. Conflict, frustration, and the theory of threat. J. abnorm. (soc.) Psychol.,
1943, 38, 81-86.
11. ----------. Dominance, personality and social behavior in women. J. soc. Psychol., 1939, 10,
3-39.
12. ----------. The dynamics of psychological security-insecurity. Character & Pers., 1942, 10,
331-344.
13. ----------. A preface to motivation theory. Psychosomatic Med., 1943, 5, 85-92.
14. ----------. & MITTLEMANN, B. Principles of abnormal psychology. New York: Harper & Bros.,
1941.
15. MURRAY, H. A., et al. Explorations in Personality. New York: Oxford University Press,
1938.
16. PLANT, J. Personality and the cultural pattern. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1937.
17. SHIRLEY, M. Children's adjustments to a strange situation. J. abrnorm. (soc.) Psychol.,
1942, 37, 201-217.
18. TOLMAN, E. C. Purposive behavior in animals and men. New York: Century, 1932.
19. WERTHEIMER, M. Unpublished lectures at the New School for Social Research.
20. YOUNG, P. T. Motivation of behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1936.
21. ----------. The experimental analysis of appetite. Psychol. Bull., 1941, 38, 129-164.
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