
In a longer speech delivered on Lord John Russell's motion in 1828, he divided the subject into
three parts: (1) the extension of the suffrage. (2) the mode of election, and (3) the duration of
Parliaments.
(4)
The suffrage, he said, ought to be extended, but `the other two points appeared to
him to be of deeper interest.' He inquired, `Of what use was it that the power of choosing its
representatives should be given to the people, unless the free exercise of that right were also
secured to them?' The only way to give them this free exercise was to introduce the ballot `Unless
the system of ballot were resorted to, it would be in vain to attempt any reform at all of Parliament.'
The `wisdom of our ancestors' argument he brushed away with scorn. `He thought the present
generation possessed not only as much wisdom as any of those which had preceded it, but a great
deal more.
On questions of foreign policy he did not speak, except once on March 18, 1828, when he rose to
protest against the inference that those who, like himself, had attended a dinner given to the
Spanish minister, were in favour of war. `He felt a deep sympathy with the Spanish people,' but `had
no hesitation in declaring his opinion that it would be wise in this country to keep out of the war.' He
voted consistently against the Foreign Enlistment and Alien Bills.
As to the Queen, he voted against the Government but did not speak.
A subject on which he seems to have expended some study, and to have felt very keenly, was the
policy of prosecutions for blasphemy. He was in favour of the mast unrestricted liberty of expression,
as well - as of opinion. Speaking on March 26, 1823, in favour of the prayer of Mary Ann Carlile for
the remission of the exorbitant fine, non-payment of which was detaining her in gaol after the
expiration of her sentence of imprisonment, he protested against the Attorney-General's demand
that the woman must first express contrition for her offence, or, as he preferred to put it, `must
commit an act of the most shameless duplicity, in order to become a proper subject for the mercy of
the Crown.' This led him to denounce the practice of asking a witness in court whether he believed
in a future state, and declining to take his evidence if he said he did not.
`Blasphemy,' he said, `was an offence which it was quite impossible to define. - Nobody, in
committing it, was aware of what he was offending against. It was one thing in this country and
another in France. . . . He must now inform the House that after a long and attentive consideration of
the: question, he had made up his mind' that prosecutions ought never- to be instituted for religions
opinions. All religious opinions, however absurd and, extravagant, might be conscientiously believed
by some individuals. Why, then, was one man to set up his ideas on the subject as the criterion from
which no other, was to be allowed to differ with impunity? Why was one man to be considered
infallible, and all his fellow men as frail and erring creatures? Such a doctrine ought not to be
tolerated; it savoured too much of the Inquisition - to be received as genuine in a free country like
England. A fair and free discussion ought to be allowed on all religious topics. If the arguments
advanced upon them were incorrect and blasphemous, surely they might be put down by sound
argument and good reasoning, without the intervention of force and punishment.' - -
Wilberforce was. scandalised by this speech, and complained that `the hon. member for
Portarlington seemed to carry into more weighty matters those principles of free trade which he had
so successfully expounded.' He appealed to Paley's teaching that ridicule, invective, and mockery
on religious subjects might be suppressed without violating religious liberty. -
On July 1, 1823, a petition was presented from certain minis- ters of religion and their congregations
deprecating the prosecutions for blasphemy. Joseph Hume delivered a long speech and proposed a
resolution to the effect that Free discussion has been attended with more benefit than injury to the
community, and it is unjust and inexpedient to expose any person to legal penalties on account of
the expression of opinions on matters of. religion.' Wilberforce opposed, objecting to `ribaldry and
indecency,' and again quoting Palsy. Ricardo followed in support of the motion. Paley, he thought,
was more liberal than Wilberforce, and `he, as well as the other chief ornaments of the Church, for
instance, Dr. Tillotson and Dr. Porteous, had asserted, in the largest sense, the right of unfettered
opinion.' As in his speech of March 26, he drifted into an attack on the plan of asking a wit- ness
whether he believed in a future state. He read a long passage from Tillotson
`for the purpose of showing, and from a great authority in the Church. that the obligation of religion
was not alone considered as the influential test of moral truth, and that a man might be very
sceptical upon doctrinal points, and yet very positive in the control of -- moral impressions distinct
from religious faith. For instance, there was Mr. Owen of Lanark, a great benefactor to society, and
yet a man not believing (judging from some opinions of his) in a future state. Would any man, With
the demonstrating experience of the contrary before his eyes, say that Mr. Owen was less